




VOL V || ISSUE II || SPRING 2020
THE INTERNATIONALIST
Undergraduate Journal of 
Foreign Affairs
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Volume V                Issue II                Spring 2021
2
THE INTERNATIONALIST
This image is of the Schneeburg auf dem Schönberg, Schneeburg being the name of the castle in ruins and Schön-
berg being the mountain it finds itself on. The Schneeburg was built in the 13th century by the Herren von Horn 
burg. Given to feudal sovereignty of the St. Gallen monastery in 1349 in exchange for control of some of the local 
area, the castle was abandoned by 1500 and fell into disrepair.
Photo by Kathryn Obenshain, Class of 2022
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FROM THE EDITOR
     The pieces you’re about to read are the culmination of hard work, diligence, and dedication from a 
team of talented editors and authors. Despite the challenges of yet another remote semester, the Interna-
tionalist team has delivered on its promise to showcase stellar pieces of undergraduate student research 
and writing. I couldn’t be more proud of that. 
     In the past school year, we’ve expanded our staff tremendously, started our wildly successful website 
and international relations blog, significantly increased the number of  editions we print, and accepted 
photograph submissions for our journal from undergraduate students around the country. These are 
changes that the Internationalist needed in order to flourish, and I’m so excited to have been a part of it 
all. Although this will be my last year on staff, I know that we are moving in the right direction. 
     Special thanks go out to Aida Al-Akhdar, my Executive Editor, who has spearheaded external com-
munications for this journal with such grace and determination; our Head Design Editor Mariana Her-
erra, whose expertise and flair we simply could not do without; our incredible Managing Editors Ash 
Huggins and Hannah Rubenstein who I am so confident are the right hands for the journal to be left 
in next year; and our Marketing Director Emma Holmes, a ray of sunshine who champions our online 
presence.  
     I give my biggest thanks of all to our incredibly talented staff – the Spring edition truly wouldn’t be 
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THE INTERNATIONALIST
Lessons From the Wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan 
By Zoe Hatsios
Zoe Hatsios is a member of the Class of 2023 pursuing majors in Peace, War, and Defense 
(National Security and Intelligence) and Political Science with a minor in Information Systems. 
Her interests include U.S. Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern studies, and International Relations. 
This piece was inspired by a desire to deeply understand the implications of seminal American 
foreign policy decisions. 
countries and of the failure to reach 
counterterrorist and state-building 
goals, American public opinion has 
shifted largely against the wars.3 Yet, 
despite a toppling national debt and 
both vertical and horizontal growth 
of terrorist groups,4 both Obama 
and Trump initially supported in-
creasing troop levels to the Middle 
East.5 Since both wars were similar 
in their mission, these strategic fail-
ures offer many meaningful lessons. 
An analysis of what caused the U.S. 
to enter Iraq and Afghanistan and 
what keeps U.S. military presence in 
the Middle East, as well as an under-
standing of weak state dynamics, is 
necessary to determine the primary 
lesson(s) that can be drawn from the 
conflicts.
 The circumstances which fu-
eled the entrance into Afghanistan 
in late 2001 were primarily ground-
ed in the 9/11 attacks.6 Entrance 
into Iraq in 2003 was rooted in the 
faulty judgement that Saddam Hus-
sein was fostering a quickly devel-
oping Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) arsenal, but the reasoning 
for the U.S. military’s prolonged stay 
has shifted as initial goals became 
clearly unattainable.7,8 The original 
force presence in Afghanistan of 
about 1,300 troops grew to 2,500 
when the Taliban fell.9 But when 
the U.S. invaded Iraq, the Taliban 
regrouped, which led Bush to send 
10,000 more troops (bringing the 
total in 2008 to 31,000) and later 
70,000 by Obama (reduced to 9,800 
in 2016).10 In Iraq, after it became 
known that Hussein did not possess 
WMD, the Bush Administration ad-
opted the goal of “democratizing” 
the Middle East.11 The continued 
force presence in Iraq prompted an 
insurgency and a civil war, which 
allowed the Islamic State and Iran-
backed militias to gain power.12 The 
Trump administration set a goal to 
remove all troops from Afghanistan 
by late 2021, after having initially 
added troops to prevent the emer-
gence of a terrorist power vacuum.13 
Trump’s plan also included reducing 
troops in Iraq to nearly 3,000. This 
On September 11, 2001, the United States encoun-tered two comprehensive 
and unforeseen dilemmas, brought 
forth by the suicide attacks which 
took the lives of many American 
citizens. A plan of action had to 
be formulated, for recovering in-
ternally by ensuring the safety and 
comfort of American citizens, and 
for avenging the terrorist attacks 
by targeting Al-Qaeda, a terrorist 
group which operated out of the 
Middle East (originally Pakistan). 
The Bush Administration’s solution 
was to launch a public, global War 
on Terror which “[would] not end 
until every terrorist group of global 
reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated.”1 Nineteen years later, the 
U.S. military is operating counter-
terrorism missions in eighty nations 
on six continents, and it has cost 
nearly six trillion dollars and half a 
million lives.2 However, a significant 
portion of the U.S. strategy has fo-
cused on Iraq and Afghanistan. As 
a result of involvement in these two 
9
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change provoked mixed reactions 
from top officials, but was some-
what necessary to retain a version of 
peace following the US drone strike 
that killed General Qassim Suleima-
ni (a top Iranian officer) at Baghdad 
International Airport.14 The mili-
tary presences in Iraq and Afghan-
istan have not led to the long-term 
defeat of major terrorist groups or a 
restructuring of a new regime, and 
conflict spillover has escalated proxy 
wars into direct confrontations with 
Iran and Syria.15
 One of the primary les-
sons drawn from the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan is that the United 
States should not use military force 
to overthrow foreign governments 
in weak states. This multifaceted 
approach can be broken down into 
four concepts: state-building takes 
a long time;16 nation-building is im-
possible;17 democracy must be con-
structed internally;18 and the U.S. 
military cannot solve internal state 
problems which require peaceful 
diplomatic relations.19
 As defined most compre-
hensively by M. Chris Mason from 
the United States Army War College, 
Afghanistan represented a “com-
plete lack of nationhood…[and] le-
gitimacy of governance,  and “com-
pletely inadequate and unmotivated 
security forces.” The latter statement 
is similar to the situation of South 
Vietnam, where the U.S. historically 
failed through an enormous amount 
of civilian casualties and a win for 
communist forces.20 Building a na-
tion — forming a shared political 
identity that transcends tribal and 
ethnic divides — can only be done 
slowly as an internal social process, 
and is therefore impossible as a for-
eign policy objective.21 State-build-
ing, on the other hand, “refers to a 
situation where the structure, au-
thority (legitimate power), law, and 
political order have fallen apart and 
must be reconstituted in some form, 
old or new.”22 By this definition, 
state-building has been successful-
ly achieved in Germany, Japan, and 
Korea through 70-100 year commit-
ments by U.S. military force presence 
and economic investment. There-
fore, building a state (which was one 
goal in the Iraq War in particular) 
was possible. Where the presence in 
Iraq differed, just as it had in South 
Vietnam, was that officials and mil-
itary officers were rotated every six 
to twelve months for ten to twelve 
years. Not only was the military 
present for a much shorter dura-
tion, but the continuous re-station-
ing formed an environment where 
little expertise could be gained and 
utilized.23 It was no surprise that the 
government implemented in South 
Vietnam lasted three years, and in 
Iraq only two years.24 Since the ob-
jective of democratizing the Middle 
East is both ideological and cultural, 
the United States should use peace-
keeping presence, diplomatic rela-
tions, and economic aid, instead of 
military force; more specifically, the 
U.S. must peacefully target and grow 
civilian groups, rather than project-
ing military offenses at terrorist mi-
litias and killing token leaders (like 
Osama bin Laden).25
 However, this broad tacti-
cal suggestion does not take into 
account factors that caused failures 
in pre- and post-war planning, such 
as confirmation bias,26 baseless na-
tionalistic morale,27 the absence 
of an alternative identity to aid ci-
vilian survival,28 inadequate train-
ing,29 and an unclear post-invasion 
strategy.30 These pitfalls yield more 
deliberate instructions for future 
military interventions that involve 
either targeting terrorist groups or 
overthrowing foreign governments 
in weak states.
 Although the military inva-
sion of Afghanistan was somewhat 
rushed due to the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks, the war in Iraq was not, and 
there was room for more detailed 
planning mechanisms in both cases. 
Neither invasion strategy took into 
account the fact that the Middle 
East is not a direct security threat 
to the United States (as Russia and 
China are).31 Any force presence, 
especially if targeted at a terrorist 
group, would therefore be largely 
symbolic, and for this reason, need 
to be receded quickly.32 Foreign ter-
rorist attacks contribute to a small 
portion of deaths worldwide, and 
almost none on American soil,33 and 
both military capability and staying 
power are finite.34 Resources should 
therefore be focused on great-pow-




 In both cases, the Bush Ad-
ministration’s judgement in particu-
lar was severely clouded by rhetoric 
that any war could be won and that, 
in weak states, the process would be 
quick and easy. This factor set the 
initial invasion of Iraq apart from 
past wars. The CIA had missed crit-
ical nuclear developments in Paki-
stan and was in effect looking for 
any evidence to support military 
force in Iraq on the premise that 
Saddam Hussein had resumed de-
veloping a nuclear arsenal, so the 
green light was given when the re-
port confirmed the Bush Adminis-
tration’s suspicions.35 This decision 
has attracted overwhelming criti-
cism because it was highly inaccu-
rate and violated international law, 
as Iraq had “represented no threat 
to the U.S. and had no links with 
Al-Qaeda.”36 Nevertheless, the na-
tionalistic grounding of Bush’s strat-
egy remains present in the reason-
ing for further deployments to the 
Middle East. For example, President 
Obama’s remarks such as ‘I lead the 
strongest military that the world has 
ever known,’ in the context of out-
lining strategy in Syria and China, 
reflects this reasoning.37 Despite the 
large death toll, the Taliban hold-
ing control of much of Afghanistan, 
and opium production quadrupling, 
President Trump continues to insist 
that U.S. strategies are working, just 
as Bush and Obama had deceitfully 
claimed in the past.38
 Lastly, after the wars had 
been initiated, neither strategy in-
cluded a calculated plan for post-
war action or stabilization and 
peace, likely due to the fact that 
military strategy in these wars was 
in the hands of civilian officials with 
no experience in combat.39 Too few 
troops were left in Iraq to prevent 
looting, restore basic services, and 
move against the insurgency so that 
it would not further spread.40 This 
calls into question the sudden de-
cisions of the Trump administra-
tion to significantly decrease troop 
deployments in both countries, in-
cluding all private security contrac-
tors, trainers, and advisors.41 This 
could potentially further fracture 
the polity in support of terrorist 
groups, render the U.S. unable to 
monitor developments without a 
military base foothold, and leave the 
domestic military untrained.42,43
 Given these circumstances, 
there are multiple specific lessons 
to be drawn from these two wars: 
if a conflict is not an immediate se-
curity threat, but rather a symbolic 
one, a short-term strategy should be 
employed and troops should be re-
moved as soon as possible. If force 
presence is not receded quickly, a 
new strategy should be developed 
that addresses post-war involve-
ment and American military train-
ing, in particular. But above all, 
the nationalistic rhetoric of civilian 
leadership must not factor into war 
strategy or intelligence assessment.
 These lessons overlap, and 
evaluating military strategy in the 
War on Terror must address both 
broad and narrow failures in order 
to propose future objectives. The 
first distinction that must be made 
is that terrorism is not a strategy; it 
is an idea, and therefore it cannot 
only be combated through military 
means.44 Terrorist groups gain trac-
tion in fragmented societies where 
any appeal to organization is desir-
able.45 To combat this in weak states, 
any intervention style should be 
equipped with a ready alternative 
for civilian loyalty. It must first be 
distinguished whether the country 
has the capabilities for a new state 
to be built (i.e. must have a national 
identity, as was absent in Afghan-
istan) before U.S. aid is provided.46 
In terms of aid for state-building, 
the only real forces that are help-
ful are peacekeepers and economic 
assistance. In most circumstances, 
weak states will not pose a huge 
threat to American national securi-
ty. For these reasons, there is no use 
for prolonged conflict (more than 
ninety days), and resources should 
be focused in other regions after 
immediate threats have been defeat-
ed. If prolonged conflict is initiated, 
though, post-war planning is criti-
cal to any lasting success, given that 
a power vacuum would be formed 
upon exiting. Generally speaking, 
the Achilles’ heel of U.S. foreign 
policy is the democratic savior com-
plex, which most critical members 
of civilian and military leadership 
demonstrate. The quest to spread 
democracy is a waste of time and 
resources, especially when military 
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force is involved; state building often 
needs to be led from within, and the 
tendency of American leadership to 
wage war for token validation is un-
justified. Furthermore, the primary 
lesson of the wars in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan is that if the United States 
decided to militarily intervene to 
overthrow a foreign government 
(after exhaustive cost-benefit analy-
ses of using other means), thorough 
post-war planning, utilizing a vari-
ety of expert sources, should be im-
plemented.
 There are many takeaways 
from the wars in Iraq and Afghani-
stan (and the War on Terror in gen-
eral), but whether broad or detailed 
lessons are more relevant is not as 
important as ensuring that they are 
learned. The impending conflicts 
with Iran and Syria progressed es-
pecially quickly under the Trump 
Administration, and if the strategic 
mistakes outlined above are not cor-
rected, there is no telling what the 
consequences will be. The United 
States’ national debt is on track to 
nearly double by 2029, largely as a 
result of major defense spending 
and domestic tax cuts.47 This should 
provide an even more compelling 
reason for allocating resources (es-
pecially militarily) wisely and cor-
recting the mistakes of the ongo-
ing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
through future military objectives.
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Zwinger Palaceis the most famous architectural moment in Dresden, Germany. Here is a view of it in the night 
sky. 
Photo by Danny Sachs, Lafayette College Class of 2022
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This picture was taken in the Tràng An scenic area in northern Vietnam, a UNESCO world heritage site. The 
river winds through small limestone mountains and cliffs for several miles.
Photo by Christian DeSimone, Class of 2021
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This photo capture's a Springtime sunset over the town of Heidelberg, Germany. 
Photo by Melina Pearson, Class of 2020
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Propaganda and the Duality of 
Media: A Look into the Tactics of 
the RTLM in Rwanda
By Brianna Corrie
Brianna Corrie is a sophomore double-majoring in Peace, War, and Defense & Media/Jour-
nalism with a concentration in Advertising and Public Relations. She is passionate about the 
intersection of media and government, especially as it relates to propaganda and misinforma-
tion campaigns. This piece was inspired by a class discussion and seeks to answer the popular 
question, "how could we allow this to happen?" 
aligned itself heavily with the Na-
tional Republican Movement for 
Democracy and Development party 
(MRND). The newspaper was estab-
lished following the 1990 Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion from 
Uganda. From the very beginning 
of its publications, Kangura featured 
strong anti-Tutsi propaganda. The 
paper had a variety of tactics to in-
cite hate towards the Tutsis, includ-
ing sexually graphic depictions of 
Tutsi women, as well as other offen-
sive cartoons to cater to the illiterate 
population of Rwanda.1 In Decem-
ber of 1990, Kangura published a 
“Ten Commandments of Bahutu,” 
which encouraged Hutus to break 
all ties they had with Tutsis, wheth-
er that be professional, business, 
or marital relationships.2 The “Ten 
Commandments” were not as well 
received by the Hutu population, so 
the paper switched to other tactics 
to incite stronger anti-Tutsi senti-
ment. One of those tactics included 
an emphasis on the living conditions 
in 1957 rather than the 1990s; Kan-
gura continually attempted to dig 
up repressed feelings that inspired 
revolutionary action.3 Moreover, 
the paper played up the fact that the 
Tutsi were the favored group by the 
previously ruling Belgians and re-
named the Tutsis as colonizers.
Print Media Environment
     It is important to note that while 
Kangura is the most well-known 
newspaper, the overall print media 
industry only appealed to a small 
section of the population based on 
literacy rates and the wealth of the 
readers. In an April 1991 census, only 
57% of the population could read or 
write.4 Additionally, the print media 
industry relied heavily on external 
financial support. “When the private 
press was first established, a news-
paper sold for 50 Rwandan francs 
(about US $0.30). After devaluation 
of the Rwandan franc by 67 percent 
Ethnic polarization was long established in Rwanda, stem-ming from the colonial lega-
cies set forth by the ruling Belgium 
colonizers, who favored the minori-
ty Tutsis over the majority Hutus. 
The various media outlets in Rwan-
da at the time did not introduce new 
ideas, but rather inflated the pre-ex-
isting tensions between groups to 
catalyze violent action. This paper 
explores the specific tactics em-
ployed by the Radio Télévision Libre 
des Mille Collines (RTLM) to pro-
mote genocide between the years 
1993 and 1994. 
Contextual Background: 
Kangura Print Media
     When considering the role of 
media in the Rwandan Genocide, 
most people think of RTLM; how-
ever, RTLM drew a lot of inspiration 
from print media preceding 1994. 
Specifically, RTLM drew influence 
from Kangura, a newspaper that 
17
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in November 1990, under an In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) 
structural adjustment program, the 
cost of a copy doubled.”5 This means 
that newspapers that aligned them-
selves with affluent political parties, 
such as the MRND, were the most 
successful. Upon obtaining finan-
cial viability, newspapers also had to 
find markets and create distribution 
systems. Only government newspa-
pers were able to reach individuals 
living in rural areas, meaning that 
most of the population did not even 
know newspapers with different 
opinions existed. This is also be-
cause the Ministry of Information 
created barriers to the creation of 
such newspapers. In 1992, the gov-
ernment passed a law recognizing 
freedom of the press, but it required 
journalists to get authorization from 
the Ministry of Information and 
jump through a number of hoops 
before getting approval to publish.6 
So, while recognizing the freedom 
of the press, the government and 
the ruling party (MRND) could still 
limit the amount of information ac-
cessible to the Rwandan public.
Introduction to Radio
     For the aforementioned reasons, 
much of the Rwandan population 
utilized radio broadcasts as their 
means to get information. Prior to 
1991, Radio Rwanda was the only 
radio station and acted as the of-
ficial voice of the government. It 
broadcasted appointments and dis-
missals of government posts, re-
minders from the president, as well 
as candidates admitted to second-
ary schools.7 Radio Rwanda even 
broadcasted false information about 
the progress of war, but most people 
did not have access to independent 
sources to verify these claims.8 In 
March of 1992, Radio Rwanda was 
used to promote the killing of Tut-
sis in Bugesera by falsely reporting 
Tutsi mobilization to attack Hutus. 
At this point, the government rec-
ognized the freedom of the press as 
voices of dissent for Habyarimana’s 
government grew louder and loud-
er.
RTLM’s Tactics in Promot-
ing Genocide: Introduction
     As the voices of dissent from the 
Tutsi minority grew louder, so did 
the government’s pushback. The 
RTLM was launched as a semi-pri-
vate radio station in July 1993, fol-
lowing the signing of the Arusha 
Accords. The Arusha Accords also 
drew in United Nations peacekeep-
ing forces to help parties implement 
the agreement. While polarization 
was always present in Rwanda, 
events in nearby Burundi furthered 
this divide. The Hutu Burundi pres-
ident was assassinated on October 
21, 1993, leading the Hutus of Bu-
rundi to attack Tutsis.9 Converse-
ly, Tutsis started executing reprisal 
killings of the Hutus. Overall, these 
incidents caused people to question 
the integrity and effectiveness of the 
Arusha Accords.10 The RTLM sen-
sationalized reports of these events 
in order to increase the population’s 
fear of the Tutsi. From October on, 
the RTLM repeatedly and forcefully 
promoted extremist ideas to further 
divide Hutus and Tutsis. In April 
1994, Habyarimana’s plane was shot 
down,  which advanced extremist 
ideas in the media. Moving forward, 
the RTLM continued to air hate 
speech and escalated to instructing 
the killings of Tutsis in Rwanda.11
     When learning about the RTLM’s 
role in the Rwandan Genocide, it 
is easy to adopt the stereotype that 
Rwandans are blind followers, poor-
ly educated, and easily manipulated. 
This stereotype is dangerous, as it di-
minishes the media and the RTLM’s 
role in promoting these violent, eth-
nic killings. The show was formulat-
ed and designed to deliver MRND 
propaganda, and it employed a va-
riety of tactics to mobilize the Hutu 
majority to violent action. Some of 
the tactics employed included the 
use of an interactive format, the ex-
trapolation of previous knowledge, 
the incorporation of elements of 
truth, the exacerbation of existing 
tensions, the strategic use of lan-
guage choice, and, finally, the ma-
nipulation of fear as a tool for mo-
bilization. 
Interactive Format to Reach 
New Audiences
     One of the main benefits of utiliz-
ing radio for mass communication 
was that it could reach a larger au-
dience of people. Because freedom 
of the press was granted in 1992, 
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Knowledge to Increase 
Trust and Legitimacy
     One of the biggest questions sur-
rounding RTLM is how a station 
that incites so much violence and 
hate could gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of its listeners. To unpack this 
question, we must analyze it from 
two different levels. First, the station 
built on Hutus’ previous knowledge 
and inclinations to gain trust from 
listeners. The incorporation of ev-
eryday people onto the station cre-
ated a psychological loyalty from 
the start, whether listeners realized 
it or not. According to Maslow’s Hi-
erarchy of Needs, loyalty is directly 
tied to your customers’ (or in this 
case, listeners’) feeling of belong-
ing.15 Given the colonial legacy of 
a Tutsi elite, the RTLM was a place 
where grievances could be aired and 
appreciated by others with similar 
experiences. It provided the Hutu 
majority with this very feeling of be-
longing, which then culminated in 
a steadfast loyalty and obedience to 
the radio station. Moreover, RTLM 
entwined its propaganda with les-
sons taught in schools to build cred-
ibility amongst the Hutu listeners. 
For example, the station empha-
sized the idea that Hutus and Tutsis 
were different peoples by nature, of-
ten equating these differences to the 
fundamental differences between 
males and females.16 The technique 
of assessing a “biologically supe-
rior” ethnic group is nothing new, 
as it was also used to justify slavery 
in America. Also, propaganda ex-
ploiting the tensions between Hutus 
and Tutsis was not unprecedented. 
In fact, a lot of the information the 
station broadcasted was inspired by 
the Kangura newspaper.17 The only 
difference was that RTLM used its 
platform and lively, casual format to 
present this perspective in a more 
digestible way. 
     Lastly, the interactive broadcasting 
format was not a short-lived, intro-
ductory tactic, but a technique used 
throughout the genocide. Journal-
ists from RTLM often interviewed 
people at the roadside checkpoints 
of Kigali and gave them an opportu-
nity to explain on air what they were 
doing and why.18 This further legit-
imized the violence the show en-
dorsed, as ordinary people received 
real-time confirmation of others 
committing these acts. 
Utilizing “Experts” and Ele-
ments of Truth to Increase 
Credibility
     While the RTLM exploited the 
predispositions of its listeners to gain 
trust, it also employed techniques to 
gain credibility among those who 
might be on the fence with their 
message. The station regularly cited 
intellectuals or university professors 
as the source of their information. 
While this may be true, the sourc-
es were often from Habyarimana’s 
home region and some of his most 
devout supporters.19 Furthermore, 
the advancement and continued 
employment of some of these “ex-
perts” was reliant on their support 
more and more voices came on air 
and drowned out the messages of 
Radio Rwanda. In turn, supporters 
of the MRND and a related party 
launched the RTLM in July 1993 to 
combat the disadvantage in num-
bers. The RTLM was specifically 
designed to echo the message of of-
ficial authorities but deliver the ma-
terial in a more informal manner. In 
fact, while many Hutu and MRND 
elites backed the RTLM, the price of 
the share was kept relatively low to 
attract the average, middle class cit-
izens.12 Aside from being econom-
ically appealing, the show’s format 
took on a conversational and casual 
approach. In the beginning, RTLM 
was very similar to any other ra-
dio station you might hear today—
they played modern music, had 
quick-witted announcers, and even 
allowed for listeners to call in to 
request songs or exchange gossip.13 
RTLM made an effort to incorporate 
everyday citizens on to the show to 
build a reputation of being “for the 
people.” Even the announcers and 
staff of the station gained popular-
ity; announcer Kantano Habimana 
was known for his quick-wit while 
announcer Valerie Bemeriki was 
known for her speed and passion 
of delivery.14 Overall, the format of 
the show was designed to appeal to 
a new, younger audience—specifi-
cally those who were poor and felt 
deprived of the privileges that the 
Tutsi minority enjoyed.
Building on Previous 
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of the government, thus giving them 
another incentive, aside from home-
town loyalties, to falsify or exagger-
ate information for the RTLM.20 
     The RTLM also incorporated ele-
ments of truth into its broadcasts in 
order to gain credibility. The station 
took a position against UN pres-
ence in the region, Tutsis, RPF, and 
RPF supporters. The UN showed up 
in the region in 1993, and in sev-
eral cases, behaved badly towards 
Habyarimana supporters. These 
instances provided the RTLM with 
a credible kernel of truth to build 
credibility and further support for 
their cause.21 As time went on and 
the RTLM gained more popularity, 
it started directly promoting action 
in the genocide. For most, follow-
ing orders from a semi-private ra-
dio station seems absurd. However, 
many local authorities of Rwandan 
villages and towns instructed their 
constituents to treat the radio as di-
rect orders from themselves.22 The 
backing from local authorities thus 
substantiated RTLM’s credibility 
even more in the eyes of the Hutu 
population.
Exacerbating Existing Ten-
sions through the Use of Ex-
aggerations
     Another technique of the RTLM 
was to exacerbate the existing ten-
sions of ethnic groups by exaggerat-
ing or embellishing events. The fact 
that the Hutu-Tutsi tensions went 
beyond Rwandan borders helped 
muster support for MRND propa-
ganda. For example, when the Hutu 
President of Burundi was assassinat-
ed by a bayonet blow to the chest, the 
RTLM reported the incident with 
extreme exaggerations. It reported 
details of torture and castration of 
the president, which stemmed from 
the ethnic practices of pre-colonial 
Tutsi kings when they defeated ene-
my rules.23 Not only was this infor-
mation false, it also reminded listen-
ers of the old practices of Tutsis and 
evoked the same feelings of revolu-
tionary action.
Strategic Use of Language 
to Dehumanize and Facili-
tate Genocide
     From its conception, the RTLM 
was very strategic in its use of lan-
guage. There was a large effort to blur 
the lines between Tutsis and the RPF. 
Inyenzi, meaning cockroach, was 
often used when referring to RPF 
combatants and its supporters to de-
humanize them.24 Furthermore, the 
station would use terms like “Tutsi” 
and inyenzi interchangeably when 
referring to RPF combatants, so that 
listeners automatically associated all 
Tutsis with the RPF, and therefore 
saw them as enemies. The RTLM 
even broadcasted that RPF combat-
ants were dressing in civilian clothes 
and disguising themselves.25 The de-
scription of the RPF disguises, how-
ever, was simply a description of a 
Tutsi. While it may seem minute, 
the interchangeable use of RPF and 
Tutsi terms helped condition, facil-
itate, and legitimize violence later 
on. Additionally, RTLM frequently 
used euphemisms to convince lis-
teners that violent action taken to-
wards the Tutsis was for the “com-
mon good.” The station called for 
individuals “ready to work,” and the 
elimination of those not willing to 
“work.”26 The use of the word “work” 
as a euphemism for “kill” not only 
disguises the act from what it is but 
presents killing the Tutsis as a civic 
duty of the Hutus.
The Manipulation of Fear as 
a Tool for Mobilization
     The previously mentioned tac-
tics were used simultaneously, but 
they all paved the way for the RTLM 
to exercise its true power and in-
fluence in the genocide. Perhaps 
the most powerful tactic, however, 
was its ability to manipulate fear in 
order to mobilize action. “For in-
stance, a May 20, 1994, broadcast 
described Tutsis as gathering guns, 
killing Hutu families and burning 
down their houses, then hiding in 
a church preparing for another at-
tack.”27 The overwhelming fear ex-
perienced by Hutus provoked the 
burning of this church. The station 
also instructed the killings of specif-
ic targets. One broadcast instructed 
residents to eliminate Antoine Se-
bera, a Tutsi business man. Anoth-
er broadcast instructed assailants to 
attack a mosque where Tutsis were 
seeking refuge.28 Every attack in-
structed by the RTLM was framed 
to be an act of retaliation. They of-
ten told listeners that the specified 
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year before the Rwandan Genocide 
changed the will of the Western 
world to even commit itself to the 
betterment of the developing world. 
The october 1993 Black Hawk Down 
incident killed eighteen Americans 
and propelled the U.S. to pull out 
from the region.30 While hundreds 
of thousands of Somalis were dying, 
the price for U.S. involvement be-
came too high. Moreover, the Amer-
ican public was extremely scarred 
by Paul Watson's photo of an Amer-
ican soldier’s corpse being desecrat-
ed by Somali civilians.31 The conflict 
in Rwanda picked up immediately 
after the horrors in Mogadishu, so-
the fear of casualties was heavy on 
the American public’s mind. Only 
two days after Habyarimana's plane 
was shot down, ten Belgian peace-
keepers were tortured and killed. 
The timing of these events only re-
inforced the fear of American death 
and provided more reason for the 
U.S. to remain uninvolved.
     While the media played a great role 
in catalyzing action within Rwan-
da, it failed to do internationally. In 
1994 alone, the U.S. media was con-
sumed by the news of Aldrich Ames’ 
arrest for espionage, O.J. Simpson’s 
arrest for murder, and Tonya Hard-
ing’s kneecapping of a figure skating 
rival. 32 33  In fact, “during the 100 
days of the Rwandan Genocide, 
ABC, CBS, and NBC offered more 
coverage of Tonya Harding than of 
the Rwandan Genocide.”34 Roméo 
Dallaire questions why this was—
asking if it gained attention because 
of a love of pathos or general excite-
ment, or if someone else guided the 
media away from covering Rwan-
da.35 Either way, Rwanda was of no 
interest to the United States nor to 
the international community. Many 
actors viewed the conflict as flare-up 
tribalism, rather than an organized 
and systematic genocide. A repre-
sentative of a major power told Dal-
laire, “You know, this country is of 
no strategic value. Geographically 
it provides us nothing. It’s not even 
worth putting a radar station here. 
Economically it’s nothing, because 
there are no strategic resources.” 36 
Whether the Rwandan Genocide’s 
lack of media international media 
attention was a poor timing issue or 
something more methodical is up 
for interpretation. With the horrors 
experienced by the American public 
following the Somalia conflict, one 
can question whether internation-
al media attention of the Rwandan 
Genocide would have even made 
a difference in U.S. involvement or 
not. 
Conclusion
     The Rwandan Genocide is one 
of the biggest failures of the interna-
tional community, and in turn, one 
of the biggest humanitarian crises 
in history. The RTLM is a prime ex-
ample of expert propaganda. It at-
tracted new audiences, exacerbated 
pre-existing divisions, gained legit-
imacy and credibility, utilized stra-
tegic language and exploited peo-
ple’s fears to direct genocide. It is a 
targets were planning attacks, and 
that the only way to stop these at-
tacks and ensure the safety of the 
Hutus was to eliminate them first. 
Additionally, every attack was also 
celebrated on air and praised as an 
act of heroism. With all the report-
ed Tutsi attacks, the RTLM had even 
prepared explanations as to why no 
bodies were being found. Some of 
these explanations were plausible, 
like the disposal into bodies of wa-
ter. Other explanations claimed that 
the Tutsis carved open Hutus and 
ate their organs.29 The RTLM was 
so good at its propaganda because it 
played on people’s emotions and de-
livered the rationalization of violent 
action on a silver platter. Whenever 
a listener questioned the informa-
tion broadcasted, the RTLM had al-
ready prepared a counter argument 
and evidence to legitimize itself. In 
combination with all the other tac-
tics, the RTLM’s manipulation of 
fear mobilized violent action that 
often went unquestioned by its au-
dience.
International Media
     The RTLM proves that media can 
play a significant role in catalyzing 
action. However, this very idea is 
challenged by the lack of interna-
tional media attention and inter-
vention in the Rwandan Genocide. 
In order to answer this significant 
question, we first must look at the 
international context.
     For starters, the American ex-
perience in Somalia just one short 
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crisis that raises many questions to 
this day: what if international media 
used these same tactics to promote 
intervention? What if the genocide 
occurred at a different time? What 
if Rwanda was of more strategic val-
ue to the major powers? While the 
outcome of the genocide cannot be 
changed, it provides a number of 
lessons to learn from in the future. 
In a time of increasing intercon-
nectedness and globalization, the 
media continually proves to be a 
powerful force that catalyzes action 
– for good or for bad. By monitoring 
the media environment of failing 
states, the international community 
can gain a better understanding of 
the actors’ power, the intensity of 
tensions, and early warning signs 
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(Left) This photo was taken off the Rialto Bridge of the 
Grand Canal as the sun sets over Venice, Italy. 
Photo by Tori Huggins, Emory University Class of 2022 
(Right) Sun-sitting on the beach in front of the hazy 
Indian skies. 
 
Photo by  Jaya Mishra Class of 2022
24
THE INTERNATIONALIST
Contemporary Conflict: The 
Role of Hybrid and Asymmetric 
Threats
By Matthew Pierro
Matthew Pierro is a second-year student studying Peace, War, and Defense, Global Studies, 
and Russian at UNC Chapel Hill. His academic interests include international development and 
security in the Central Asian, Russian, and Eastern European regions. Matthew was inspired to 
write this paper upon researching new principles of modern warfare, and how defense strate-
gies can more appropriately define and combat emerging security threats in the 21st century.
be discussed to exemplify asymmet-
ric and hybrid tactics in warfare. 
Finally, national and international 
defense systems will be examined, 
from which recommendations to 
combat asymmetric and hybrid tac-
tics will be made.
Introduction    
     Though the terms “conflict” and 
“warfare” see interchangeable use 
in modern rhetoric, we must rec-
ognize the elevation of violence 
and destruction that warfare in-
volves. In making this distinction, 
we must also be wary of the biases 
introduced by traditional literature 
on warfare, assuming its state-like 
nature. “Conflict” can be framed by 
the clash of opposing blocs, sparked 
by ideological, territorial, or oth-
er disagreements. Conversely, we 
define “warfare” as “sustained, co-
ordinated violence between political 
organizations”.1 This definition pro-
vides a more flexible approach to 
warfare, and it emphasizes several 
components. First, war is violent. 
Warfare involves the use of force to 
kill people and wage destruction. 
This violence must be sustained to 
qualify as warfare, which is an ex-
clusionary factor when classifying 
something as a conflict or a war. 
Conflicts and disputes are common 
in international relations, but rare-
ly do they escalate to war; such an 
escalation would require violence, 
the use of force, and then sustaining 
this violence for a period of time.2 
A second component in identify-
ing war emphasizes the “between” 
in our definition. Violence must be 
reciprocated to qualify as war; thus 
we treat war as the outcome of the 
behavior of two or more actors.3 It 
is important to clarify that “actors” 
participate in war, not necessarily 
states. This paper emphasizes the 
role of non-state actors in both con-
flict and warfare, while criticizing 
the antiquated definitions of warfare 
In recent decades, the inter-national stage has witnessed warfare’s evolution away from 
conventional tactics. Whereas, his-
torically, rivaling nation-states du-
eled on rigid battlefields to deter-
mine a clear victor, modern tactics 
have blurred the lines between war 
and peace while also removing defi-
nite fronts, actors, and necessary 
capabilities. This is representative of 
contemporary asymmetric threats: 
generally used by weaker actors in 
conflict to exploit vulnerabilities in 
a more powerful opponent, they cir-
cumvent direct confrontation while 
being irregular and difficult to com-
bat. In unison with traditional war 
tactics, these asymmetric conflicts 
combine to form hybrid warfare. 
This paper will seek to define asym-
metric and hybrid threats, their sta-
tus-modeling conflict in the 21st 
century, and the actors, both state 
and non-state, that drive their use. 
Further, a variety of case studies will 
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that preclude such actors. 
     The concept of war is neither new 
nor uniform: warfare has long been 
subject to evolutionary forces and 
its existence has been defined ac-
cording to a variety of historical and 
present perspectives. Whereas the 
above definition approached war 
with a broad, non-state scope, much 
of historical and contemporary lit-
erature ignore such cases. Carl von 
Clausewitz, a Prussian general and 
military theorist active during the 
Napoleonic Wars, provided sever-
al definitions of warfare: once as 
“[the] continuation of policy by other 
means,” while later as “...nothing but 
a duel on an extensive scale” and “...
an act of violence intended to com-
pel our opponent to fulfill our will.”4 
Clausewitz’s implication of warfare 
as state-dominated was a product 
of conventional tactics prominent 
in his era. Nonetheless, to many, 
the prevailing perception of warfare 
is similarly conventional in nature. 
Military historian John Keegan pro-
posed this in his political-rational-
ist theory of war, saying “[warfare] 
is assumed to be an orderly affair in 
which states are involved, in which 
there are declared beginnings and 
ends, easily identifiable combatants, 
and high levels of obedience by sub-
ordinates.”5 Per Keegan, this theo-
ry deals poorly with non-state and 
non-conventional tactics, which is 
the subject of this paper.
     The rationalist theory finds 
company in academic literature. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a Genevan 
philosopher and enlightenment 
thinker, argued “war is a relation 
not between man and man but be-
tween state and state.”6 Even Web-
ster’s Dictionary, a supposed arbi-
trator of word usage, defines war as 
“a state of...conflict between states or 
nations.”7 Conventional warfare fits 
within these classifications: glob-
al security has historically evolved 
around the clashes of nation-states 
and their militaristic ventures. The 
end of the 20th century and notably 
the Cold War, however, has demon-
strated a dramatic shift in the sphere 
of conflict.  
     Witness to increasingly powerful 
nation-states with numerically ex-
travagant armies and weapon arse-
nals, pure conventional warfare has 
lost its position as a viable means 
of completing political goals. As of 
January 2019, the United States mil-
itary budget exceeded $700 billion 
dollars.8  Even accounting for infla-
tion, this exceeds the United States’ 
Cold War average by over $100 bil-
lion dollars.9 Boasting a military of 
this strength, conventional warfare 
with the United States is not a prac-
tical strategy. The disparity is blatant 
in the ongoing conflict in Iraq: in 
2019, Iraq’s military budget valued 
roughly $7.6 billion in US dollars, 
a fraction of the resources wield-
ed by the United States.10 As such, 
counters to U.S. offensive attacks 
(such as the assassination of Irani-
an commander Qassem Soleimani, 
which was itself asymmetrical) in-
clude frequent mass demonstrations 
and, more violently, a rocket attack 
on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. 
11 In sum, warfare has been forced 
to adapt to the powers that partici-
pate in it. Nonetheless, warfare rep-
resents more than the individuals or 
weapons involved: it is the theater in 
which opposing values clash, and in 
modern society it has morphed into 
a path around the stalemate between 
powerful national armies.  
Definitions: Asymmetric 
Threats
     Referenced above, select na-
tion-states dominate military spend-
ing (and generally global conflict). 
A prominent example is the United 
States, whose national defense bud-
get constitutes nearly 40% of global 
military spending, while their al-
lies account for (roughly) another 
third.12 This accumulation of force 
proves counter to deterrent efforts: 
according to the Serbian Report of 
the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
released in May 1997, “U.S. domi-
nance in the conventional military 
arena may encourage adversaries 
to use such asymmetric means...”13 
Thus, the concept of asymmetric 
threats was introduced, proposed to 
“...avoid direct military confrontation 
with the United States,” and “disrupt 
the US command, control, commu-
nications, and intelligence networks, 
[and] deter allies...from supporting 
US intervention.”14 Steven Metz, an 
American national security expert 
at the U.S. Army War College,15 cri-
tiqued this nation-specific defini-
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tion and proposed a more complete 
definition of asymmetric strategy: 
“[in military affairs] asymmetry is 
acting, organizing, and thinking dif-
ferently than opponents to maximize 
relative strengths, exploit opponent’s 
weaknesses or gain greater freedom of 
action.”16 Contrary to nation-states 
in the upper echelons of military 
spending, weaker sides in conflict 
must circumvent direct attacks in 
favor of unexpected tactics, due to 
their own shortcomings as well as 
the superiority of their opponent. 
These asymmetric approaches em-
ploy innovative, nontraditional tac-
tics, and weapons or technologies 
that are irregular in nature.17
     Asymmetric threats include a 
variety of tactics, including disin-
formation campaigns, terrorism, 
and cyberattacks. Importantly, these 
tactics exist under the threshold for 
conventional conflict while still de-
stabilizing governments, alliances, 
or organizations.18 According to the 
Ministry of Defense in Serbia, cer-
tain characteristics are inherently 
asymmetric: 
1. considered unusual from a con-
ventional point of view (i.e. tor-
ture); 
2. irregular in the sense that they 
violate treaties or laws of armed 
conflict; 
3. depart from war as previously 
understood, (as in flying planes 
into buildings); 
4. leveraged or specialized against 
assets; 
5. difficult to respond to propor-
tionally, creating a situation 
where military intervention in 
response seems inhumane or 
cruel; 
6. having unforeseen circumstanc-
es, typical of an event or attack 
not previously used.19  
Stephen Blank, a Senior Fellow at 
the Foreign Policy Research In-
stitute and published author on 
asymmetric threats,20 presents an-
other interpretation of asymmetry, 
labeled “Blank’s Theory.”  Blank’s 
Theory classifies asymmetric threats 
within five dimensions: 
1. “they are threats of non-conven-
tional nature; 
2. they are designed to mislead the 
opponent; 
3. they can be used by both state 
and non-state actors; 
4. they do not imply confronta-
tion, and; 
5. they reflect the opponent’s strat-
egy.”21 
In both scenarios, these tactics are 
intangible and entirely flexible, cre-
ating military action that is unpre-




     Hybrid warfare exists in concert 
with asymmetric threats, blending 
conventional and irregular tactics.22 
In this sense, hybrid warfare “...com-
bin[es] military and non-military 
as well as covert and overt means, 
including disinformation, cyber at-
tacks, economic pressure, [and the] 
deployment of irregular armed 
groups and use of regular forces.23 
Franck Hoffman, a Distinguished 
Research Fellow with the Institute 
for National Strategic Studies, builds 
on this definition: he argues that hy-
brid warfare incorporates different 
modes of warfare (both conven-
tional and asymmetric capabilities), 
thereby utilizing synergistic efforts 
that are simultaneous, fused, and 
subordinate to one command unit.24
      According to some military ex-
perts, this unconventional theater 
of conflict can further be described 
as the “Gray Zone” of warfare, char-
acterized by “...intense political, 
economic, informational and mili-
tary competition more fervent than 
steady-state diplomacy, yet short of 
conventional war,” and employing 
“small-footprint, low-visibility opera-
tions often of a covert or clandestine 
nature.”25 This hybrid zone utilizes 
operations below internationally 
recognized thresholds and con-
ventional, on-the-ground tactics. 
Though hybrid tactics are tradition-
ally linked to non-state actors (ter-
rorist organizations, for example) 
waging wars against more powerful 
foes, Hoffman argues that hybrid 
wars neither supplant conventional 
warfare nor relegate future threats 
to sub-state actors.26 To this point, 
the Russian annexation of Crimea in 
2014 and subsequent cyberattacks, 
media manipulation, and criminal 
agitation have been increasingly cit-
ed by policy experts (and contested 
by many others) as a prominent na-
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tion-state fusing conventional and 
asymmetric means under one com-
mand.27  Additionally, operating in 
the Gray Zone, the United States 
countered the September 11th ter-
rorist attacks with small special 
operation forces (SOF), carrier and 
land-based airstrikes, and indige-
nous Afghan fighters to depose the 
illegitimate Taliban government, 
which was giving refuge to al-Qae-
da.28 Alongside their asymmet-
ric means, the U.S. “boots on the 
ground” presence of roughly 350 
SOF and other operatives made this 
a hybrid approach.29  Either state or 
non-state, consensus acknowledg-
es hybrid warfare’s combination of 
tactics utilized, some conventional 
and some asymmetric, and the stra-
tegically and simultaneously coordi-
nated efforts that are unlike those of 
previous wars.30
The History of Convention-
al Warfare
     At the beginning of the 21st centu-
ry, conventional warfare was loosely 
defined as “the confrontation of two 
or more countries to defeat the other 
by means of armed forces and win-
ner’s dictation of peace conditions”. 
31 More specifically, conventional 
warfare can be examined as mili-
tary action supported by economic 
pressure, information relations, and 
diplomacy from the state. Through 
conventional political channels the 
government guides operations, the 
population provides the productive 
means, and the military uses them 
in conflict.32
     This strategy has largely defined 
historical warfare. In 1945, United 
States forces under the command 
of General Douglas MacArthur ap-
proached Manila, the capital of the 
Philippines, in an attempt to erad-
icate the Japanese presence from 
the archipelago.33 The defending 
Japanese forces were strongly and 
relentlessly committed to holding 
the city. In the face of tremendous 
ground casualties, American air 
commanders persisted in request-
ing General MacArthur to approve 
aerial bombardment to assist U.S. 
ground troops. MacArthur repeat-
edly denied the request, stating that 
while Japanese forces would like-
ly be killed, so too would innocent 
Filippino civilians.34 Without aerial 
support, both sides suffered heavy 
casualties, though the United States 
prevailed in capturing the city. 
Nonetheless, MacArthur argued, 
the world would have reacted in 
horror had the U.S. employed aerial 
forces.35 Circumventing the princi-
ples of conventional warfare was an 
unacceptable cost.
     The complex history of war pro-
vides context for this reluctance to 
engage in any tactics deemed “ir-
regular.” Constructed in academic 
literature, warfare is classified into 
four distinct “generations” (five 
phases).36 Each generation features 
radically different warfare strategy. 
The tactics used in Manila have few 
parallels to the methods embraced 
by modern Iraqi fighters.  The gen-
erations include:  
1. Wars before nation-states;
2. “Classical Warfare” (Generation 
1), including the Napoleon-
ic wars: lined arrangements of 
musketmen on battlefields;
3. “All Together Industry” (Gener-
ation 2), including World War 
I: the industrial revolution and 
wider railroad availability ush-
ered in auxiliary and infantry 
units;
4. “Maneuver Wars” (Generation 
3), extending back to WWII: 
“blitzkrieg” strategies, which 
targeted the weakest part of the 
enemy;
5. “Unconventional Wars” (Gener-
ation 4), including the aftermath 
of September 11th and the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.37
As evidenced above, the fourth gen-
eration departs quite extremely from 
the tactics of prior wars and en-
compasses asymmetric and hybrid 
methods unique to modern conflict. 
A 1989 article in the Marine Corps 
Gazette (a professional journal for 
the US Marines disseminating mili-
tary art and science) introduced the 
concept of “fourth generation war-
fare.” Here, “...warfare seems likely 
to be widely dispersed and largely 
undefined; the distinction between 
war and peace will be blurred to the 
vanishing point.  It will be nonlinear, 
possibly to the point of having no de-
finable battlefields or fronts.  Also, 
the distinction between ‘civilian’ and 
‘military’ may disappear.”38 This cen-
ters on the ability of weaker powers 
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to combine conventional and ir-
regular tactics to pose a legitimate 
threat to an opponent’s political 
will. As such, the fourth generation 
(constituting hybrid warfare) does 
not attempt to win by defeating an 
enemy’s military forces, but through 
hybrid tactics aimed at an enemy’s 
political will.39
Warfare’s Transition
     As warfare progresses, the ques-
tion remains: why are asymmetric 
and hybrid strategies dominating 
global conflict? Curiously, the an-
swer lies in defensive efforts against 
these tactics: extreme discrepan-
cies between actors’ military capa-
bilities has incentivized the use of 
asymmetric and hybrid threats.40 
In other words, there is a disparity 
between actors with the capacity to 
accumulate large armies and those 
without. This has created an envi-
ronment where less powerful actors 
must engage in hybrid tactics to re-
duce the disparity.41 The U.S. and its 
allies best represent this, with their 
national budgets constituting 40% 
and roughly a third of global spend-
ing.42 “Weaker” nation-states, which 
includes almost everyone else, can-
not compete through convention-
al channels with the West. Thus, 
historical wars pitting two nations 
against each other on a battlefield 
have been rendered obsolete.
     Inequality in military capacity is 
not the lone transforming force: the 
doctrine of mutually assured destruc-
tion (MAD) is an evolutionary de-
fense strategy based on the concept 
that “neither the United States nor its 
enemies will ever start a nuclear war 
because the other side will retaliate 
massively and unacceptably,”43 po-
tentially with nuclear weapons. This 
doctrine applies narrowly to nations 
of nuclear capacity, yet serves as an 
additional deterrent to conventional 
war. In sum, post-Cold War society 
has forced state and non-state actors 
to pursue irregular tactics in war-
fare to combat an escalating arms 
race between opposing ideological 
blocs. These conditions are directly 
responsible for the transition away 
from conventional warfare, and 
their maintenance on a global scale 
will only serve as additional encour-
agement for the usage of asymmet-
ric threats and hybrid tactics.
     Though conventional war has 
seen a decline in modern conflict, 
it remains in use by global powers 
against weaker nations and vice 
versa. Demonstrated by the trends 
outlined above, this type of war-
fare is becoming difficult, outdat-
ed, and ineffective against irregular 
opponents. Nonetheless, especially 
alongside hybrid tactics, conven-
tional warfare can be advantageous. 
The U.S. government engaged in 
aspects of conventional warfare 
against the Ba’athist government in 
Iraq.44 This nation-state against na-
tion-state, enemy-specific attack was 
replicated to an extent in Crimea in 
2014, where Russian troops invaded 
the peninsula and combined hybrid 
with conventional tactics.45 These 
examples demonstrate increasing 
hybrid tactics, but also the need for 
nations to remain vigilant against 
conventional ones. 
Actors of Warfare
     From the perspective of conflict 
analysis, actors in warfare are all 
those engaged in or being affected by 
conflict, otherwise considered “who 
intervenes.”46 John McDonald, a for-
mer U.S. Ambassador, diplomat, 
and peacebuilding expert, intro-
duced the concept of “Multi-Track 
Diplomacy” which distinguished 
nine tracks of conflict-resolution 
and expanded on a previous list of 
actors in conflict.  Despite the ex-
panded list, McDonald maintained 
Multi-Track Diplacy’s foundation 
of two central sub-groups: official 
states/governments and unofficial, 
non governmental and non-state 
groups.47 For the purpose of this pa-
per, actors will refer to these large 
sub-groups, characterizing each ac-
tor as being tied (or not tied) to a 
sovereign nation, therefore as “state” 
or “non-state.” Though state actors 
are capable (and willing) to organize 
asymmetric efforts, their position 
on asymmetric conflict generally 
differs from that of non-states and 
therefore is considered separately. 
     The state contains traditional mil-
itary and political authority which 
relies on its own economic and diplo-
matic power.48 Comparatively, non-
state actors employ a non-hierarchi-
cal structure of motivated “cells” with 
common motivations and political 
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goals.49 This compartmentalization 
works in favor of organizations such 
as terrorist groups that must leave 
potential vulnerabilities decentral-
ized. State and non-state actors are 
inherently different, crucially so in 
regards to sovereignty: according 
to a report released by the National 
Intelligence Council, non-state ac-
tors are non-sovereign entities and 
therefore are not legitimized on a 
global stage.50 Nonetheless, under-
standing both actors is vital to any 
discussion surrounding asymmetric 
and hybrid warfare. Russia, a pow-
erful nation-state, and the Islamic 
State, a terrorist non-state actor, op-
erate vastly differently despite both 
engaging in hybrid and asymmetric 
tactics, and both must be under-
stood in prospective defensive ef-
forts.
State Actors
     State-actors represent the tra-
ditional consolidation of authori-
ty and the central elements of the 
international system.51 Defined by 
Higher School of Economics Pro-
fessor Timofei Bordachev, a state is 
a politically organized body of people 
at an established territory with pub-
lic authority and the legal use of force 
and violence.52 This monopoly on vi-
olence differentiates sovereign states 
from other actors that lack similar 
territory or authority.53 Importantly, 
nations must be recognized by oth-
er sovereign states through interna-
tional channels, such as the United 
Nations, to achieve this status. Fur-
ther, the state must have public au-
thority, governing tools, and territo-
ry and population to rule.54 Legality 
aside, certain states exercise con-
flict beyond their borders, wield-
ing armies large enough to warrant 
conventional conflict or relying on 
hybrid and asymmetric means to 
circumvent international laws that 
would inflict potential consequenc-
es. 
State Actors: Libya and Rus-
sia 
     Nation-states are capable of abus-
ing asymmetric tactics to achieve 
political goals, as exemplified by the 
Libyan Civil War between the inter-
nationally recognized Government 
of National Accord and the Libyan 
National Army.55 Neighboring na-
tions and global powers have be-
come increasingly involved in the 
conflict through asymmetric tac-
tics. For example, both Turkey and 
Russia have trained mercenaries to 
be dispatched in Libya.56 Elsewhere, 
Turkey and the UAE have contin-
ued devastating airstrikes, jockey-
ing over (what some consider) the 
largest drone war in the world.57 
Disinformation campaigns have in-
creased alongside physical strikes, 
particularly through bots and trolls 
deployed by Russia, the UAE, and 
Saudi Arabia in favor of the Libyan 
National Army.58 These develop-
ments demonstrate modern “wars 
at distance”: technology, social me-
dia, proxy wars, and private armies 
of mercenaries allow states to par-
ticipate in conflict and destabilize 
opposing governments without ac-
tively engaging in the carnage. 
     Whereas the Libyan conflict fea-
tured nation-states and non-state 
actors in coordination, Russia’s ag-
gressive international actions have 
demonstrated the capability for a 
state to execute hybrid and asym-
metric attacks without international 
assistance or a pre-existing conflict. 
Through tactics of disinformation, 
cyberwarfare, and support for for-
eign political movements, Russia 
has tactfully played the line below 
conventional war.59 In 2017, a dis-
information campaign, widely be-
lieved to have originated in Russia, 
falsely accused German soldiers 
deployed in Lithuania of raping a 
teenage girl, stirring anti-soldier 
sentiments.60 Elsewhere, Russian 
disinformation efforts have target-
ed the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) partner countries 
to undermine citizen’s support for 
joining the alliance, in addition to 
cyberattacks targeting the Demo-
cratic National Convention in the 
United States, leaking vulnerable 
information online that jeopardized 
U.S election security.61 In these sce-
narios, Russian efforts sought desta-
bilization, manipulation of citizens, 
and vulnerability in nations Rus-
sia considers as global foes. This is 
further evident in overt and covert 
Russian support for political groups, 
their funding of a French far-right 
national group, and aiding networks 
of non-governmental organizations 
30
THE INTERNATIONALIST
shifting European public opinion 
towards a positive view of Russian 
politics.62
     Russia is just one example of a 
prominent nation-state engaging in 
hybrid tactics. Both in states with 
the capabilities for conventional 
warfare and those who fight proxy 
wars abroad, asymmetric threats 
have proven effective in causing 
mass disruption to national govern-
ments and supra-national organi-
zations. Thus, as their effectiveness 
remains consistent on a global stage 
and their methods remain below 
the threshold for conventional war, 
defense strategies must be adjusted 
to fully combat asymmetric means, 
and security experts must acknowl-
edge the threat that nation-states 
pose. 
Non-State Actors
     Non-state actors are defined as 
“non-sovereign entities that exercise 
political, economic, or social” control 
at either a national or internation-
al level.63 These actors operate out-
side the confines of a conventional 
state, pursuing their political agen-
das through means more difficult to 
contain or regulate. Forming a con-
sensus on non-state actors has prov-
en difficult for scholars and national 
governments alike. Nonetheless, a 
flexible list includes the following, 
per the United States National Intel-
ligence Council:
1. multinational corporations and 
organizations;





This is not a summative list, but 
rather an introduction to several 
non-state actors in global politics. 
However, in the context of hybrid 
warfare, terrorist organizations and 
criminal networks participate as the 
most important actors.    
     In examining conflict, two main 
groups of non-state actors can be 
identified in accordance with their 
operating tendencies. Non-violent 
non-state actors, including multina-
tional corporations, can have pro-
found effects on a nation’s economic 
or political state, with the potential to 
also exert harmful influence or un-
due control over a region.65 Violent 
non-state actors, however, generally 
present national and international 
consequences of extreme magnitude, 
and are characterized by their ability 
to rely on violence and force through 
asymmetrical channels.66 Militias, 
warlords, insurgents, terrorist and 
criminal gangs, and transnational 
criminal groups all exemplify the 
range of violent non-state actors.67 
As previously theorized, the usage 
of asymmetric and hybrid threats 
stems from a disadvantaged mili-
tary position, where non-state ac-
tors or weaker states must approach 
warfare through irregular and un-
expected tactics to sustain victory. 
This becomes evident when exam-
ining specific examples of non-state 
actors and their methods, such as 
terrorist organizations operating in 
the Middle East, Africa, or South-
east Asia. 
Non-State Actors: Terrorist 
Organizations
     On September 11th, 2001, the 
actualization of asymmetric threats 
posed by non-state actors was ful-
ly realized. Hijacking commercial 
aircrafts and piloting them towards 
buildings symbolizing the glob-
al authority of the U.S. departed 
quite extremely from warfare in 
the trenches, and this shifted U.S. 
foreign policy to the primary role 
of counterterrorism.68 The admin-
istration of President George W. 
Bush declared a “War on Terror,” 
gathered information and targeted 
the terrorist non-state actors re-
sponsible, which represented the 
United States’ own effort in hybrid 
warfare and dealing with non-state 
actors.69 U.S. forces operated in the 
previously defined “Gray Zone,” de-
ploying SOF, carrier and land-based 
airstrikes, and irregular Afghan 
fighters to depose the illegitimate 
Taliban government, which was 
giving refuge to al-Qaeda.70 Despite 
fighting occurring largely in the na-
tion-states of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the perceived threats from U.S. strat-
egy were al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 
emphasizing the role that non-state 
actors can play in global conflict and 
their complicated relationship with 
nation-states.71
     The September 11th terrorist 
attacks and subsequent geopoliti-
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cal consequences modeled an in-
creasing fusion of non-state and 
state forces. This created a gap in 
contemporary military terminolo-
gy and strategy filled today by the 
widely utilized “asymmetric and 
hybrid threats.”72 Neither terrorism, 
the organizations behind these at-
tacks, nor tactics in the following 
Afghan invasion were unknown to 
the US in 2001. However, combin-
ing conventional “on the ground” 
military action (such as the deploy-
ment of U.S. SOFs) with irregular 
methods of insurgency, war on in-
formation, and cyber attacks rep-
resented a departure from previous 
military strategy.73 Further, despite 
frequent terrorist activity both pri-
or to and since September 11th, this 
awoke much of the world to poten-
tial threats posed by terrorist—and 
generally non-state—actors such as 
al-Qaeda and presently the Islamic 
State. 
Platforms of  Warfare
After the dramatic arrival of asym-
metric threats in global conflict, 
national defense strategies eagerly 
rushed to identify and address po-
tential tactics. This proclivity ran 
counter to an actual comprehen-
sion of the term: asymmetry quickly 
came to define every threat faced in 
international conflict, and this care-
less application rendered the con-
cept useless.74 Substantive critique 
from academics contested the label 
of threats themselves as asymmet-
ric, instead of the nature of strate-
gies utilized.75 In reference to “plat-
forms” of asymmetric and hybrid 
warfare, this paper seeks to identify 
and address this complaint.
     The idea of “platforms of warfare” 
is not widely addressed in academia, 
and this makes asymmetric tactics 
difficult to reliably quantify. There-
fore, this paper looks to introduce 
the concept of platforms of warfare 
as an overarching classification of 
asymmetric threats characterized by 
the nature of the threat utilized. This 
definition relies on the logic that 
asymmetric and hybrid tactics, or 
“means” exist within a greater con-
ceptual platform. For example, a cy-
ber attack is an asymmetric threat 
dependent on computer technolo-
gy and communication networks. 
From this, cyber attacks can be de-
termined to exist within the plat-
form of information warfare.
     Beyond this, this paper looks to 
acknowledge a platform widely uti-
lized today and referenced above: 
information warfare. This example 
is not an all-encompassing list; sev-
eral other platforms exist, notably 
terrorist activity. To maintain the 
scope of this paper, however, infor-
mation warfare will be briefly ex-
plored while cyberattacks, a central 
asymmetric threat within that plat-




     The past few decades have revolu-
tionized information and commu-
nication technologies in society, in-
troducing modern telephones, radio 
signals, and satellites. To optimize 
military strategy, warfare has shift-
ed alongside technology: broadly, 
information warfare is a struggle 
over these information and commu-
nication systems, and the application 
of destructive force on a large scale 
against information assets and sys-
tems and against the computers and 
networks that support this critical in-
frastructure.76  These increased com-
munication systems have created a 
societal reliance on them, leaving 
organizations potentially vulnerable 
to information warfare that damages 
or freezes their networks. However, 
increased communication systems 
can be similarly favorable to offen-
sive information attacks: whereas 
once information was a tool of the 
state, (in certain nations it remains 
that way) asymmetric opponents 
today wield the power to make and 
distribute their own information to 
much wider audiences. 77 This ability 
has ushered in new areas of conflict 
operation, enabled states to engage 
in mass disinformation campaigns, 
and allowed wars to be fought re-
motely behind a monitor.78  
     Commonly utilized by rogue 
nations or non-state actors seeking 
destabilization, cyberattacks and 
cyberwarfare are central to informa-
tion warfare. These tactics represent 
a particularly advantageous strat-
egy due to the limited assets they 
require: with secure networks and 
infrastructure, actors can leverage 
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massive disruption and destabilize 
government networks, elections, or 
the networks of supranational or-
ganizations from abroad.79 This ca-
pability of “warfare from abroad” 
allows states to conceal their actions 
or motives, avoid international con-
sequences (such as sanctions), or 
prevent the carnage possible in con-
ventional intervention.  
     During the Kosovo War in 1999, 
Serbian hackers, in concert with 
their Eastern European sympathiz-
ers, launched global attacks aimed 
at shutting down key computer sys-
tems in NATO countries.80 Despite 
knowledge that this attack was not 
sufficient to win the war, the Serbs 
successfully stalled the NATO of-
fensive and disabled temporary 
response and communication sys-
tems.81 These cyberattacks are ru-
dimentary compared to the infor-
mation warfare used today: among 
other nation-states and non-state 
actors, China and Russia are capable 
of waging catastrophic cyber attacks 
on rival states, vastly more damag-
ing than those utilized by Serbia in 
1999. With disinformation cam-
paigns, trained cyber experts, and 
the world’s increasing reliance on 
global networks, these powers have 
many vulnerable targets to exploit 
and will continue to do so under the 
threshold of warfare.  
     As mentioned previously, infor-
mation warfare is not the lone plat-
form of asymmetric means.  Though 
broad in scope, terrorism represents 
another.  This includes attacks lev-
eraged by terrorist organizations, 
though terrorism may also result 
from state-waged violence through 
the use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, biological weapons, attacks on 
critical infrastructure that society 
depends on, or from attacks on peo-
ple and government institutions.82 
The threat of terrorism continues to 
loom large over the Western world, 
especially as military accumulation 
forces non-state actors to utilize ir-
regular tactics.  Therefore, this plat-
form must be addressed as fever-
ently as information warfare in an 
effort to stall its global rise.
Asymmetric Threat Case 
Study: Cyber Attacks
     Cyber operations and their role 
in conflict represent a dramatic shift 
in society over the past few decades. 
Under the veil of anonymity and the 
threshold for conventional conflict, 
cyber attacks are an emerging asym-
metric threat being utilized to create 
great destruction. Academia hosts 
several definitions for the concept 
of cyberattacks, though specifically 
for this paper cyber attacks refer to 
“...hostile acts using computer or re-
lated networks to disrupt or destroy 
an adversary’s cyber systems or func-
tions.”83 Whereas cyber attacks refer 
to isolated incidents, cyberwarfare 
expands upon this concept as “...
massively coordinated digital as-
saults on one government by another 
or by large groups of citizens, as when 
cyber attacks are orchestrated by 
state-sponsored hackers against an-
other nation’s cyber infrastructure.”84 
Examining these concepts, there are 
generally three targets of cyberwar-
fare: 
1. information itself; 
2. information based processes 
that collect, analyze, and dis-
seminate material of the state; 
3. the infrastructure of informa-
tion and communication sys-
tems that collect, process, store, 
transmit, display, disseminate, 
and act on said material.85
The utilization of cyber methods 
against these targets offer actors 
operational flexibility, convenience, 
and undue authority. Computer 
attacks can be launched remote-
ly or anonymously so as to avoid 
direct consequence, while their 
non-physical existence offers less 
able nation-states to be equally 
disruptive as their more-powerful 
counterparts. Whereas traditional 
warfare required a level of capabil-
ity to launch an attack, cyber meth-
ods have created a sphere of conflict 
where power can be utilized by a 
wide array of political instigators 
for damaging purposes.86 From this, 
defending national security systems 
proves difficult, especially consider-
ing how many potential threats exist; 
terrorist organizations, disgruntled 
individuals, or even hostile nation 
states can overpower cyber systems 
manned by limited numbers. 
     In recent decades, Russia has 
utilized cyber attacks as a means 
of promoting its political agenda 
abroad. In some instances, these 
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tactics are combined with conven-
tional conflict in the form of hybrid 
warfare. In 2007, following a dispute 
between the Estonian and Russian 
governments, pro-Kremlin forces 
froze Estonian networks. This cy-
ber barrage was asymmetric in na-
ture and orchestrated by non-state 
actors, thereby distanced from the 
Russian state itself.87  The follow-
ing year amidst the Russo-Geor-
gian War, Russian criminal gangs 
attacked multiple Georgian govern-
ment targets, marking the first time 
that a known cyber attack had co-
incided with shooting in war.88 This 
utilization of asymmetric means 
alongside conventional strategy ex-
plicitly demonstrates hybrid war-
fare. 
     North Korea is an additional pro-
ponent of cyber attacks. Lacking 
strategic advantages of large enlist-
ment numbers, foreign investments, 
and advanced technical equipment, 
North Korea uses asymmetric strat-
egies to offset warfare disparities 
against more powerful opponents.89 
This has made cyber attacks a 
strong strategy for North Korea: cy-
ber attacks can be conducted from 
abroad, require limited assets, and 
rely on little manpower to wreak 
considerable havoc abroad. Further, 
North Korea leverages their detach-
ment from global cyber networks to 
manipulate cyber attacks as a viable 
strategy.90
     Recognizing their reliance on 
cyber attacks, the North Kore-
an national government has made 
considerable efforts to funnel their 
brightest students into computer 
hacking and cyberwarfare opera-
tions. Government officials select 
promising students in mathematics 
to learn computer-based warfare. 
These students are then trained in 
specialized organizations before en-
tering computer hacking forces, the 
most prestigious of which is known 
as the Bureau 121. Forces like these 
have been successful in enabling 
North Korea to engage in asymmet-
ric combat from a distance, in solic-
iting funds for national use, and in 
incapacitating enemies of their ide-
ology.91
     In February 2016, $101 million 
dollars were taken from a New York 
Federal Reserve account that be-
longed to the Bangladesh Central 
Bank. A single spelling error on a 
withdrawal request raised the alarm 
that prevented the initial request of 
$1 billion from being authorized. 
This attack, later found to have oc-
curred in banks in over ten other 
nations, was eventually discovered 
to have come from North Korea. 
However, due to a lack of physical 
evidence, the funds were never re-
covered and are potentially in cir-
culation in North Korean markets.92 
This attack demonstrates the signifi-
cant capabilities of cyber attacks and 
the flexibility of their use. Rogue na-
tion-states or non-state actors wield 
the capability to freeze networks, 
shut down entire governments, or 
steal significant sums of money, all 
without direct conflict, under the 
threshold of warfare, and without 
global repercussions. 
Responses to Asymmetric 
and Hybrid Threats
     Modern conflict’s shift to asym-
metric and hybrid tactics represents 
one of the most pressing matters in 
global security. Following the ar-
rival of these tactics on the interna-
tional stage, defense doctrines and 
recommendations were released by 
national and supranational govern-
ing bodies to outline methods of 
prevention. These responses were 
preliminary in nature and are being 
continually evaluated to more prop-
erly address evolving threats. For 
example, increasing Russian hybrid 
activity has alarmed nations in Eu-
rope and NATO into further hybrid 
warfare prevention.93 As these issues 
continue to disrupt global process-
es, effective responses become in-
creasingly crucial for international 
security and must comprehensively 
address and alleviate threats posed 
by asymmetric tactics.  
     In addressing responses to asym-
metric and hybrid threats, this pa-
per will outline current European 
procedure. Though response strat-
egies to these threats will vary de-
pending on the nature of conflict to 
specific regions, European alliances, 
specifically NATO, have formulated 
comparatively advanced response 
systems that will be discussed as 
models for other global regions to 
utilize. These responses may not ap-
ply uniformly, especially consider-
34
THE INTERNATIONALIST
ing NATO’s status as a supranational 
organization. Nonetheless, the prin-
ciples that they rely on are crucial to 
combating asymmetric threats on a 
global level.  
NATO’s Response Strategy
     At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, 
NATO presented their Compre-
hensive Approach Action Plan, a 
framework to mobilize military and 
civilian resources as resistance to 
hybrid challenges.94 This represent-
ed a crucial first step in acknowl-
edging the threat of asymmetric and 
hybrid tactics, which to that point 
had not entered the public sphere. 
In December of 2015, this progress 
continued: NATO adopted a strat-
egy of confronting hybrid threats 
by increased partnership with the 
European Union (EU). This part-
nership included information shar-
ing between member states, warn-
ing signs of hybrid threats at the 
alliance’s border, and encouraging 
members to recognize potential vul-
nerabilities within their own system 
to Russian interference.95
     In recent years, joint-defense ef-
forts have been expanded by both 
EU and NATO officials. The two al-
liances have coordinated response 
strategies and established centers 
dedicated to the analysis and devel-
opment of hybrid defense, among 
them the European Center of Ex-
cellence for Countering Hybrid 
Threats. This coordination relays 
joint declarations and recommen-
dations to member states, calls on 
individual national governments to 
identify internal weaknesses, and 
encourages members to contrib-
ute to a greater security threshold 
in Europe. Despite these promising 
advancements, it remains true that 
NATO defense strategies are not be-
ing optimized and they face institu-
tional challenges to success. 
     Though NATO and the EU have 
pledged cooperation in their war 
on asymmetry, their efforts remain 
stalled by a lack of funding, a lack 
of membership commitment, and 
lack of information sharing.96  In sit-
uations of pressing hybrid challeng-
es, this lack of information sharing 
across organizations ensures a less 
effective response. Worse still, even 
attempts to promote information 
sharing within the organizations 
has proved challenging. For ex-
ample, despite Russian cyber and 
disinformation attacks on the U.S. 
2016 election, the nation shared lit-
tle information with fellow NATO 
members.97 Fundamentally, this 
hesitance makes sense: even with 
allies, states are reluctant to discuss 
internal vulnerabilities. Nonethe-
less, this approach to information 
sharing has stunted the alliance’s 
ability to appropriately respond to 
hybrid threats and create uniform 
responses to urgent issues.98
     Further, despite centers posi-
tioned to address asymmetric and 
hybrid threats, NATO’s identifica-
tion policy is unclear. In modern 
conflict, hybrid forces are common-
ly fused with conventional warfare 
and oftentimes exist without un-
derlying conflict. Despite this com-
mon occurrence, NATO’s internal 
framework addressing these conflict 
levels has no concrete response.99 
In addition, response strategies are 
stalled by NATO members’ varying 
perceptions of threat in regards to 
asymmetric tactics. Nation-states 
susceptible to Russian influence 
in Eastern Europe may call for in-
creased protections against infor-
mation warfare, while nation-states 
overwhelmed by migration from 
the Middle East in Southern Europe 
may wish to adjust their focus to 
criminal activity. NATO must find a 
way to blend their response strate-
gies to fit this range of issues, or else 
remain fractured and pulled along 
by their member’s diverse interests. 
Ultimately, however, it proves diffi-
cult to organize an alliance on a sin-
gle issue in the face of many.  
Recommendations to Asym-
metric and Hybrid Threats
     While malicious state and non-
state actors continue to engage in 
asymmetric and hybrid tactics, oth-
er global actors must not be com-
plicit in their progress and must 
recognize necessary procedures to 
be enacted. Proactively, this recog-
nition must translate to policy and 
definite changes. Therefore, this 
paper will identify several recom-
mendations to effectively challenge 
asymmetric tactics in modern so-
ciety. As European responses to hy-
brid warfare were outlined above, 
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a NATO-specific recommendation 
will be discussed. However, as rec-
ommendations are crucial to regions 
that do not already have functioning 
response systems to hybrid threats, 
generalized recommendation strat-
egies will also be addressed.
     NATO principally relies on its 
stated articles to govern and direct 
the alliance. These articles, meant to 
provide guidance in times of crises, 
are not being effectively enforced in 
a unified defense strategy. Article 
4 of the North Atlantic Treaty (the 
treaty that established NATO) states 
that parties (nation-states) will con-
sult together when, in the opinion 
of any member, the political inde-
pendence or security of a member 
is threatened.100 As previously men-
tioned, certain NATO members 
have not been transparent in their 
struggles with hybrid threats, par-
ticularly when it exposes vulnera-
bilities in a nation’s infrastructure 
or defense capabilities. Nonetheless, 
the alliance must invoke Article 4 to 
enable these difficult consultations 
and to properly address areas in al-
liance security where foreign actors 
may be meddling. To respond ef-
fectively, individual nations should 
develop “internal thresholds” that 
identify asymmetric threats.101 
When crossed, this should serve as 
an alarm to bring the issue to the 
awareness of other NATO mem-
bers. Then, NATO should facilitate 
consultations that organize effective 
responses to hybrid operations. In 
doing so, a NATO-wide response 
team to assist member-states strug-
gling with conflict would be incred-
ibly constructive for the alliance go-
ing forward.102
     Elsewhere in the world, espe-
cially in regions plagued by ter-
rorist activity or struggling with 
governmental infrastructure vul-
nerabilities, responses to hybrid 
and asymmetric threats are crucial 
in securing national defense. These 
recommendations are not nation- 
or alliance-specific, but rather they 
represent actions that would be ben-
eficial outside the scope of an inter-
national organization or any indi-
vidual nation-state. 
     For an effective national response 
to asymmetric threats, response 
mechanisms must be institutional-
ized. There is no universal solution 
to asymmetric threats; even among 
related means, such as chemical and 
biological warfare, responses differ 
greatly and can complicate defense 
strategies. Therefore, responses 
must be institutionalized by the na-
tional military and governing bod-
ies: in doing so, doctrine, strategy, 
structure of armed forces, and train-
ing must be addressed in policy and 
procedure to ensure a timely and 
effective response to hybrid attacks. 
Furthermore, understanding that 
variable asymmetric means warrant 
varying responses, an integrated 
and institutionalized defense effort 
should incorporate two primary ef-
forts: protection and threat manage-
ment. In other words, though each 
unique type of asymmetric attack 
calls for its own individualized re-
sponse, a national system must be 
organized with responses catego-
rized by defensive protections ver-
sus proactive threat management. 
Defensively, this would establish 
procedures in the scenario of an 
incoming or on-going asymmetric 
attack, whereas coordinating threat 
management systems would at-
tempt to prevent any attacks from 
materializing. These efforts should 
be coordinated with allied states and 
national partners to standardize re-
sponses globally.103
     Specific to Africa , several ad-
ditional recommendations will be 
made to secure nations from im-
pending hybrid and asymmetric 
threats. Some of these threats are 
contingent on region-specific qual-
ities, however the recommendations 
are applicable to a global audience. 
     First, nations should revisit and 
revise their threat-response mech-
anisms.104 Threats often assume a 
transnational capacity, exposing 
weaknesses in the state. Therefore, 
existing institutions and defense ap-
proaches need to constantly adapt 
to emerging threats as they appear. 
In states that are particularly frag-
mented or with less centralized gov-
ernments, this revision and policy-
making process should include the 
involvement of local or religious 
leaders who would be most knowl-
edgeable of the threats their com-
munity faces.105 Next, the coordina-
tion of efforts and existing strategies 
is imperative for a successful de-
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fense system. This revisits the issue 
of government fragmentation or 
decentralization: it is possible that 
within government bodies of a state, 
information sharing and commu-
nication procedures are ineffective. 
To improve response systems, such 
information gaps and disconnects 
must be narrowed, and intelligence 
sharing should be streamlined to be 
efficient and effective in the face of 
emergency threats.106 As part of the 
information process, warning net-
works and response mechanisms 
should be established and opti-
mized. However, these mechanisms 
will only alert the acting government 
of a potential threat. Following this 
realization of a present or potential 
national security risk, there must be 
some state capacity to respond to or 
prevent any such threat from mate-
rializing. This may be in the form of 
increased national intelligence orga-
nizational capacity, increased num-
ber of staff of intelligence operatives 
and state employees, stronger cyber 
infrastructure, or increased military 
capability to deter armed threats.107
     As part of the necessity for state 
capacity, it is recommended that 
nations improve their infrastruc-
ture as a means of defense. The lack 
of a self-sufficient economy or re-
liable infrastructure leaves states 
vulnerable to crises or attacks. For 
example, an attack of biological 
warfare might be more effective and 
spread more thoroughly in a state 
with inadequate health care.108 As 
a final recommendation, both for 
states defending against asymmetric 
threats and those that utilize them 
in conflict, the ability to resolve con-
flict without intervention, warfare 
methods, or illegal channels is im-
portant to global peace. Internation-
al diplomacy, economic relations, 
and strategic policymaking must 
be more accessible and effective. 
For non-state actors and nations to 
abandon asymmetric means, there 
must be legal channels for their po-
litical agendas to be processed.This 
should exist through international 
organizations, alliances, and coun-
cils meant to support weaker states. 
Conclusion
     Albert Einstein once said “You 
cannot simultaneously prevent and 
prepare for war.”109  In conceptual-
izing the role of modern asymmet-
ric and hybrid threats, this paradox 
of warfare rears its head. As na-
tion-states compete to accumulate 
arms and deter conventional attacks, 
less capable actors will increasingly 
revert to asymmetric means to ex-
ercise their political aspirations and 
disrupt more powerful foes. To com-
bat this, nation-states and supra-na-
tional organizations such as NATO 
must establish and refine response 
systems to defend against these tac-
tics.  Utilizing the recommendations 
above, states should institutionalize 
their responses, streamline infor-
mation-sharing procedures, and de-
velop stable infrastructure to allow 
for increased state capacity. Most 
importantly, diplomatic means and 
resolutions must be developed be-
yond intervention or asymmetric 
means. The global security realm 
must not be complacent in its battle 
against asymmetric war and war-
fare’s constant development. Other-
wise, as states develop the capacity 
to defend against current methods 
of cyberattacks or terrorism, other 
means of warfare will simply arise 
to take their place.
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This photo was taken in historic East Berlin.
Photo by Lydia Weinberger, Class of 2021
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El Camino de Santiago is a world-renowned backpacking trail in the north of Spain that dates back to the 8th 
century, when pilgrims first traveled to the burial site of James the Apostle in what is now the town of Santiago de 
Compostela. The trail weaves through major cities, small towns, barren fields, and foggy woods alike as travelers 
experience all the beauty and culture that Northern Spain has to offer. This photo was taken at Sarria, a town in 
Galicia, Spain. 
Photo by Andres Otero, Class of 2021
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A picture of Thean Hou Temple, a Buddhist temple dedicated to Mazu, a Chinese sea goddess. Built by the 
Hainanese community in Malaysia, who are originally from southern China. Photo taken at Kuala Lumpur, Malay-
sia. 
Photo by Christian DeSimone, Chemistry, Class of 2021
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cusing on the role of UN agencies in 
the creation and promotion of this 
right. This paper also highlights the 
unique circumstances of undocu-
mented Latino immigrants, focusing 
on the tension between the need to 
access assistance programs and the 
fear of punishment or deportation. 
While UN agencies have taken steps 
to protect some vulnerable groups, 
such protections are currently lack-
ing for undocumented Latino im-
migrants in the United States. De-
spite their shortcomings in securing 
undocumented migrants’ right to 
food, UN agencies can do much 
more to address food security by 
expanding the conceptualization of 
rights-holders and duty-bearers to 
encompass state obligations to un-
documented immigrants. Further-
more, this paper presents directions 
for future policy to promote undoc-
umented immigrants’ realization of 
the right to food. 
Background
     Given its profound impact on 
individual and population health 
outcomes, the right to food is a 
fundamental aspect of the overall 
right to health. UN agencies play a 
significant role in creating an equi-
table global landscape that allows 
people to secure their human rights. 
However, despite UN efforts, some 
vulnerable populations face severe 
barriers to accessing food. More-
over, lack of access to food interferes 
with political participation and in-
U nited Nations (UN) agen-cies have laid forth the framework of human 
rights, including the right to health, 
which encompasses the right to 
food. The right to food is more than 
just access to basic staples; rather, 
it has been clarified and expanded 
to include the rights to nutrition 
and food security. Although these 
rights apply to undocumented Lati-
no immigrants in the U.S., they face 
disproportionate food insecurity. 
Undocumented Latino immigrants 
are left unprotected by the national 
government, facing significant bar-
riers to accessing food assistance 
programs, health insurance, and le-
gal protection. This paper examines 
the origins of the right to food, fo-
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fringes upon other human rights. 
This paper will focus on one specific 
subset of the population: undocu-
mented Latino immigrants in the 
United States. Fifty percent of im-
migrants and seventy five percent of 
undocumented immigrants in the 
U.S. come from Latin America.1 A 
disproportionate number of Latino 
households lack adequate nutritious 
food, with over one in five house-
holds facing food insecurity.2 Those 
who are undocumented face even 
more barriers to realizing the right 
to food. This section will describe 
the right to food, the UN agencies 
that have recognized this right, as 
well as the expansion of the right to 
food to include the right to nutrition 
and food security. The explanation 
of the right to food will be followed 
by an overview of the challenges that 
undocumented Latino immigrants 
face in securing the right to food. 
The Right to Food
     The right to food is more than 
an ideal; rather, it sits in a legal-
ly binding framework of human 
rights. The right to food was first 
conceptualized in the 1948 Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which addressed food 
as an underlying determinant of 
health. Although this declaration 
was non-binding, the inclusion of 
the right to food paved the way for 
subsequent human rights measures, 
most notably the 1966 Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
both of which are legally binding for 
the 160 member-states who have 
agreed to uphold these covenants. 3 
The UN General Assembly adopted 
the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR 
as an “International Bill of Human 
Rights” to define human rights and 
normalize them under international 
law.4
     The right to food is often situat-
ed within the right to health in these 
documents. However, the right to 
food is much more than an after-
thought of the right to health; it is 
constantly being revised, expand-
ed, and clarified. For instance, after 
the Cold War, the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) established sev-
eral General Comments to clarify 
and interpret the rights set forth in 
various UN-adopted documents. 
General Comment 14, in particular, 
asserts that the right to food is more 
than the provision of basic staples. 
Rather, the right to health encom-
passes access to nutrition and oth-
er socioeconomic factors that can 
threaten good health.5 Moreover, 
the UN Commission on Human 
Rights includes a Special Rappor-
teur on the Right to Food to clari-
fy and expand the implications of 
this right. Beyond these documents, 
there are several UN agencies ded-
icated to promoting access to food. 
Most notably for this paper, the 
Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO), founded in 1945, aims 
to eradicate hunger, food insecurity, 
and malnutrition.6 The World Food 
Programme (WFP) delivers food 
assistance during emergencies and 
builds partnerships with communi-
ties to improve nutrition and food 
infrastructures throughout the lifes-
pan.7
     Over time, there has been a shift 
in the conceptualization of the right 
to food to include the rights to food 
security and nutrition. Examining 
the right to food through the lens of 
food security provides a more nu-
anced view of individual access to 
food. The concept of food security 
emerged as a response to the world 
food crisis of 1973-1974, upon 
which the 1974 World Food Summit 
described food security as “avail-
ability at all times of adequate world 
supplies of basic food-stuffs…to 
sustain a steady expansion of food 
consumption…and to offset fluctu-
ations in production and prices.”8 In 
other words, food security shifts the 
focus of the right to food beyond the 
actual food supply, to encompass the 
individual pathway to food acquisi-
tion. Such a shift is also clear in the 
Committee on World Food Security 
(CFS). Although the CFS was estab-
lished by the FAO in 1976, it wasn’t 
until 2009 that it explicitly included 
the right to food as a means of glob-
al food security.9
     Rather than solely encompassing 
basic food staples, under the FAO, 
the right to food has expanded to 
emphasize access to a nutritious, 
appropriate diet within the context 
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ble populations, do have the right 
to the highest attainable standard 
of health. However, there are a mul-
titude of challenges faced by this 
particular group that make securing 
this right difficult. About 23.3 per-
cent of Latino households are food 
insecure; undocumented Latino im-
migrants likely face even more dis-
proportionate food insecurity.13  Ac-
cording to a 2014 qualitative study of 
undocumented Latino immigrants, 
most participants reported not hav-
ing enough to eat, sacrificing their 
own food so their children could 
eat, experiencing mediocre food 
quality, and having a lack of choice 
in their food.14 It is clear that more 
work needs to be done in ensuring 
access to food security for this pop-
ulation. The challenges in applying 
the right to food to undocumented 
immigrants can be generalized into 
four main categories: health care 
barriers, occupational barriers, im-
migration status barriers, and edu-
cational or linguistic barriers.
Healthcare Barriers
     Health care, including preventa-
tive care, can play a significant role 
in granting undocumented immi-
grants the right to health. Health 
care can also guide right-holders 
towards nutritious food options 
and remedy diet-related ailments. 
Although federally qualified health 
centers that serve migrants do exist, 
these centers are often not physical-
ly accessible. Rural areas also tend 
to lack culturally and linguistical-
ly competent health care centers.15 
Even where healthcare is available, 
a lack of financial, educational, 
and procedural resources often de-
ters migrants from seeking care. 
Perhaps the most salient barrier to 
undocumented immigrants’ food 
and health access is lack of legal 
protection. Many migrants are thus 
ineligible for many health services 
without paying high out-of-pocket 
costs. For example, for the first five 
years after arrival to the US, im-
migrants are not allowed to access 
social protections, including Med-
icaid, or purchase health insurance. 
This applies to both documented 
and undocumented immigrants. 
Additionally, free health clinics that 
serve migrants are few and far be-
tween and are rarely advertised.16 
Occupational Barriers
     Undocumented immigrants are 
often vulnerable to discrimination 
and occupational hazards. Danger-
ous industries, lack of education 
and training, language barriers, and 
lack of social capital often make 
undocumented immigrants vulner-
able to exploitation.17 For example, 
migrant and seasonal farmworkers, 
many of whom are undocument-
ed immigrants from Mexico, have 
the worst health outcomes within 
the agricultural industry. Sparse 
enforcement of the Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Pro-
tection Act (MSPA) and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) Field Sanitation 
Standards leaves them even more 
vulnerable to exploitation, danger-
of an environment that promotes 
sanitation, safety, and adequate 
health care related to food.10 In oth-
er words, even if food is accessible, 
it must not exist in a vacuum. Food 
itself must be supported by the ful-
fillment of other rights, such as the 
right to health, the right to dignity, 
freedom from discrimination, and 
the right to life. Such an approach 
to the right to food is not specific to 
the FAO. In its General Comment 
12, the CESCR clarifies that physical 
and economic access to food must 
go hand-in-hand with inherent dig-
nity and be supported by economic, 
environmental, and social policies 
aimed at eliminating poverty.11 The 
WFP has come to embrace nutrition 
as part of food security as well, ex-
panding its focus from solely pro-
viding food in emergencies to pri-
oritizing malnutrition throughout 
the lifespan. This includes tackling 
undernutrition, vitamin and miner-
al deficiencies, overweight, and obe-
sity simultaneously.12 This explicit 
focus on both acute and chronic 
malnutrition clarifies that food in-
security may have structural roots 
present throughout one’s entire life.
Challenges in Applying the 
Right to Food to Undocu-
mented Immigrants
     Moving beyond the right to food 
itself, there are significant challeng-
es in applying this right to undoc-
umented Latino migrants in the 
United States. Undocumented Lati-
no immigrants, like other vulnera-
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ous work environments, and poor 
health outcomes.18 Oftentimes, 
work opportunities may be short-
term or unreliable, creating periods 
of unemployment or forcing undoc-
umented immigrants to be transient 
and change residences frequently 
to find work. Many undocumented 
migrants describe food insecurity 
as a consequence of such unsteady 
work.19
Other Immigration Status 
Barriers
     In addition to a lack of access to 
health care and health insurance, 
undocumented immigrants face 
other challenges due to immigra-
tion status or lack of legal docu-
mentation. Pursuing any govern-
ment assistance carries some risk of 
being discovered and punished or 
deported. Some undocumented im-
migrants take the risk, while others 
are discouraged entirely from seek-
ing help in any form. Specifically 
related to nutrition, undocumented 
immigrants are excluded from all 
government nutritional programs 
except for the Special Supplemen-
tal Nutrition Program for Women, 
Infants, and Children (WIC); how-
ever, children born in the U.S. to 
undocumented immigrants are eli-
gible for the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP). WIC 
benefits allow families to purchase 
specific foods to improve their nu-
trition intake, and SNAP provides 
“near-cash” assistance that families 
can use to purchase food.20 More-
over, it is quite common for undoc-
umented immigrants to be respon-
sible for sending money, known 
as remittances, back to family and 
loved ones in their country of or-
igin. The pressure of remittances 
can add stress to the daily lives of 
undocumented immigrants and 
detract from the income they can 
spend on food.21
Educational and Linguistic 
Barriers
     Many undocumented immigrants 
describe a lack of English proficien-
cy as a significant barrier to the pro-
curement of food. Indeed, linguistic 
ability can act as a barrier for food, 
health care, education, government 
services, job opportunities, and so-
cial support. Community assistance 
and kinship networks have proven 
to serve as protective factors from 
food insecurity; linguistic barriers 
jeopardize the formation of these 
positive relationships and thus in-
crease vulnerability to food inse-
curity.22 Beyond language barriers, 
educational barriers can increase 
food insecurity. A general fear and 
distrust of government officials and 
programs can lead to limited knowl-
edge about food resources, health 
care options, and other beneficial 
programs. 
     Clearly, more attention needs 
to be paid to undocumented im-
migrants’ rights, as this population 
faces unique challenges in realizing 
the right to food. Such challeng-
es are compounded by the global 
trend towards urbanization and the 
massive growth of the food indus-
try, resulting in the “globalization 
of an unhealthy diet.”23 Undocu-
mented immigrants’ food options 
are restricted by an abundance of 
low-cost, high-sugar, high-fat foods 
available for purchase in place of 
nutritious foods that promote good 
health and food security.
Reasoning
     The right to food encompasses the 
right to nutrition and food security 
for undocumented immigrants. UN 
agencies such as the WFP have tak-
en steps to protect some migrants, 
such as refugees and internally dis-
placed persons (IDP), with provi-
sions of food, cash, food vouchers, 
and other amenities.24 Such pro-
tections are currently lacking for 
undocumented Latino immigrants 
in the United States. Despite their 
shortcomings in securing undocu-
mented migrants’ right to food, UN 
agencies can address these issues by 
expanding the conceptualization of 
rights-holders and duty-bearers to 
encompass state obligations to un-
documented immigrants. This sec-
tion will examine the ways in which 
undocumented immigrants differ 
from refugees and IDP in terms of 
food procurement. It will also ex-
plore existing UN mechanisms that 
could be used to coordinate nation-
al efforts to ensure protection of the 
right to food for all, including un-
documented immigrants.
     Undocumented immigrants are 
47
VOL V || ISSUE II ||  SPRING 2021
highly processed, high-fat, and 
high-sugar foods. Such an abrupt 
shift in diet means that among U.S. 
immigrants, acculturation is associ-
ated with increased cardiometabolic 
risk, including hypertension, diabe-
tes, overweight, obesity, and hyper-
lipidemia, the causes of which stem 
from poor diet and low physical ac-
tivity.26
     Due to the extent of undocument-
ed immigrants’ integration into the 
market, some may argue that UN 
agencies are unable to stand up to 
transnational corporations, who are 
partially responsible for the lack of 
nutrition available to undocument-
ed immigrants.27 However, although 
more attention needs to be paid to 
undocumented immigrants, UN 
agencies are ultimately best suited 
to address the unique challenges 
this group faces in procuring food. 
Undocumented immigrants are not 
legally bound to the states in which 
they reside; thus, it is important 
that states look to UN agencies in 
order to address this. UN agencies 
can unite states in the coordination 
of national responses to food in-
security, thus increasing nutrition 
access for all people, but especially 
the most vulnerable, including un-
documented immigrants. For in-
stance, the FAO seeks to coordinate 
national responses to food insecuri-
ty, by providing support for design-
ing food security laws, policies, and 
programs to be implemented on the 
national level. The FAO also holds 
international conferences to address 
food security, such as the World 
Food Summits of 1996, 2002, and 
2009.28 Moreover, the FAO and the 
WHO have set universal standards 
for food and food trade through the 
Codex Alimentarius, thus standard-
izing national responses to food in-
security.29 National policies can and 
do fall short of protecting undocu-
mented migrants’ right to health; 
thus, it is crucial that states turn to 
the UN for standards, knowledge, 
and responses to food insecurity.
Policy Implications
     Policy can play an important role 
in promoting participation, trans-
parency, equality, and accountabili-
ty in realizing the right to food for 
undocumented Latino immigrants. 
This situation requires a reconcep-
tualization of rights-holders and du-
ty-bearers. Although undocument-
ed immigrants may not be bound 
to one state, it is important for the 
UN to remind states that these peo-
ple are indeed rights-holders. More-
over, the role of duty-bearers must 
include a duty to all who reside in 
a state, documented or otherwise. 
Mainstreaming human rights and 
explicit use of human rights lan-
guage is needed to remind states 
that they are bound to their human 
rights obligations. 
     Policy may also prove useful in 
implementing government assis-
tance programs that are appropriate 
for undocumented immigrants. Un-
documented immigrants and their 
children are ineligible for food as-
in a unique situation that presents 
special challenges to UN agencies 
securing their right to food. On one 
hand, this population exists in a 
very precarious situation, and many 
take extensive precautions to avoid 
revealing their lack of documen-
tation and risking punishment or 
deportation. Government outreach 
programs are few and far between, 
but even when presented with via-
ble options, many undocumented 
immigrants are hesitant to accept 
government aid for fear that they 
will be required to show proof of 
citizenship, valid ID, or health in-
surance. Furthermore, “victims of 
the violations of the right to food” 
are often unable to access judicial 
systems to redress human rights vi-
olations.25 Such options may only be 
viable for residents who can show 
proof of a green card, permanent 
residence, citizenship, or other doc-
umentation, or they may incite fear 
of punishment or deportation. 
     On the other hand, undocu-
mented immigrants are woven into 
the framework of communities in 
ways that refugees and IDP are not. 
Many are fully integrated into the 
workforce, send their children to 
public schools, and circulate mon-
ey throughout the U.S. economy. 
Many acquire food through the 
market, rather than relying solely 
on donated food assistance. Indeed, 
upon immigrating to the U.S., many 
immigrants experience dietary ac-
culturation. This involves a sudden 
shift from traditional diets to more 
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sistance programs, with the excep-
tion of WIC and SNAP.30 Govern-
ment assistance programs geared 
towards undocumented immigrants 
should be clear about their inten-
tions and clearly specify that they 
do not require health insurance or 
valid U.S. government-issued ID. 
Moreover, interviews with undoc-
umented Latino immigrants have 
revealed the importance of cultural-
ly appropriate food that is relatively 
consistent with traditional diets.31 
Future programs should account for 
cultural preferences in determining 
what food may be distributed, dis-
counted, or considered appropriate. 
The concept of food security is more 
nuanced than the mere provision of 
food staples, and policymakers must 
bear this in mind when designing 
food assistance programs. 
     Beyond undocumented immi-
grants specifically, there is much 
work to be done in easing the bar-
riers to access of nutritious food. 
One way to tackle this would be 
to regulate unhealthy, high-sugar, 
high-fat foods.32 The FAO already 
helps states write food security laws; 
it could feasibly also incorporate 
taxation into its current model. In-
creasing access to nutritious food 
will benefit all rights-holders, even 
those who have documentation 
and those who are U.S. citizens. Al-
though undocumented immigrants 
are disproportionately affected by 
food insecurity, the U.S. population 
as a whole could benefit from more 
affordable, accessible, and appro-
priate nutritious foods in place of 
cheap, fat- and sugar-loaded foods 
that threaten health.
Conclusion
    UN agencies have laid forth the 
framework of human rights, in-
cluding the right to health, which 
encompasses the right to food. The 
right to food is more than just ac-
cess to basic staples; rather, it has 
been clarified and expanded to in-
clude the rights to nutrition and 
food security. Although these rights 
apply to undocumented Latino im-
migrants in the U.S., this popula-
tion is disproportionately burdened 
by food insecurity. Undocumented 
Latino immigrants are left unpro-
tected by the national government, 
facing significant barriers to access-
ing food assistance programs, health 
insurance, and legal protection. Be-
yond the barriers outlined in this 
paper, securing undocumented 
Latino immigrants’ right to food 
will prove difficult in the face of 
populist nationalism, which threat-
ens human rights on a fundamental 
level. Unfortunately, undocument-
ed immigrants are often the target 
of state-sanctioned hatred and vio-
lence, making securing food more 
difficult than ever. Thus, it is essen-
tial that the concepts of rights-hold-
ers and duty-bearers be expanded to 
emphasize the ways in which states 
are obligated to assist undocument-
ed immigrants. 
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A sheep practices social distancing from his flock on the inner Hebrides island of Skye in Scotland. The day before, 
UK prime minister Boris Johnson closes the country’s borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo taken at Staf-
fin, Isle of Skye, Scotland. 
Photo by Jennings Dixon, Class of 2022
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Sunset trail by the mountains. Photo taken at The Alps, Interlaken, Switzerland. 
Photo by Danny Sachs, Lafayette College Class of 2022
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W.H.O Coronavirus Response 
Policy Analysis
By James McClure
James McClure is a sophomore at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill majoring in 
Global Studies and Public Policy, with a minor in French. His article was inspired by his inter-
est in the role of international institutions in foreign affairs, especially in the case of crises such 
as the COVID-19 pandemic. It was written as the final paper for PLCY 210: Policy Innovation 
and Analysis and takes the form of an analysis of several potential policy changes for the World 
Health Organization, in response to the failure of the international community to limit the 
spread of the COVID-19.
it to combat the pandemics of the 
future, or abandon it altogether and 
find a better option for the world.  
Problem Definition
     While the COVID-19 pandemic’s 
complete impact on human society 
is yet to be known, the crisis clearly 
highlighted the flaws in the World 
Health Organization’s public health 
response and enforcement mech-
anisms. On January 30, 2020, the 
WHO declared COVID-19 a “Pub-
lic Health Emergency of Interna-
tional Concern” (PHEIC), and spec-
ified that countries with vulnerable 
health systems were particularly at 
risk.4 The recommendations pro-
vided in the declaration included 
contact tracing, early observation, 
and patient isolation . Even though 
these guidelines were sound, lack 
of transparency between the WHO 
and the Chinese government played 
a significant role in the creation of 
the crisis the world now lives with in 
every aspect of daily life.
     The Chinese government contact-
ed the WHO about the Wuhan out-
break on December 31, but it was 
not until two weeks later, on January 
12, that China confirmed the full 
genome sequence of the virus with 
WHO scientists.5 Retrospective 
analysis revealed that production of 
test kits during that two-week time 
period could have significantly im-
proved the initial response in Wu-
han.6 Even after the Chinese gov-
ernment refused the WHO’s request 
for observers in Hubei province and 
underreported initial cases, WHO 
Director General Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus commended China 
for “setting a new standard for out-
break control”.7 Taiwanese officials 
also stated that the WHO did not 
respond to their initial warning re-
lated to COVID, since Taiwan lacks 
member status, due to China’s con-
tinued claims of possession over 
Taiwan. Critics believe Adhanom 
moved too slowly to declare a PHE-
IC, as there were nearly 10,000 cas-
When examining the ac-complishments of the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO), the merits of its 
role in global health governance 
are undeniable. Since the WHO 
was founded in 1947, it has been 
responsible for nearly eradicating 
polio, creating guidelines for de-
claring international public health 
emergencies, and addressing health 
inequities between developed and 
developing countries.1 Currently, 
the WHO coordinates the creation 
of the seasonal flu vaccine,2 leads 
the international response to health 
emergencies, and performs research 
and interventions on ongoing health 
crises worldwide.3 While the val-
ue of the WHO to the world seems 
obvious, its insufficient response to 
the spread of COVID-19 has shown 
the limits of its organizational struc-
ture in coordinating a global public 
health response. Many world lead-
ers are now seemingly at a cross-
roads: reform the WHO and allow 
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es by the time of the declaration.8 
It is no wonder that many view the 
WHO’s initial COVID response as 
inefficient and bending to the will of 
the Chinese authoritarian regime. 
The structure of the WHO is fun-
damentally not conducive to the 
sub-par public health responses of 
governments across the globe. The 
organization lacks any enforcement 
mechanism and possesses a budget 
nearly the size of a university hos-
pital.9 While the WHO could have 
done more to condemn the actions 
of the Chinese government, as it 
did after the lack of transparency 
by the Chinese government during 
the SARS epidemic, criticism would 
have had little impact beyond sym-
bolic signaling. The behavior of 
Western countries, who are the pri-
mary benefactors of the WHO, has 
also proved detrimental to a suc-
cessful response to COVID-19. On 
February 5, 2020, the organization 
asked for $675 million in support 
for a global preparedness and re-
sponse plan to the pandemic, pri-
marily to provide aid to the nations 
most vulnerable to outbreaks.10 By 
March 4, the international commu-
nity had only offered $1.2 million in 
support.11 The response plan did not 
receive adequate funding until the 
first week of April, when the glob-
al case count surpassed one mil-
lion.12 The actions of the U.S. and 
UK governments in this pandemic 
are excellent examples of the inter-
national community going against 
WHO recommendations. The John-
son administration’s misguided at-
tempt to initially avoid economic 
shutdowns as well as the Trump 
administration’s sustained cam-
paign of misinformation regarding 
COVID-19 highlight the WHO’s 
inability to influence foreign gov-
ernments to follow their guidelines, 
as well as the lack of repercussions 
for these actions.13 Unlike the World 
Trade Organization, the WHO has 
no ability to sanction its members, 
which makes strict enforcement of 
public health regulations nearly im-
possible.14 While it is not the fault of 
the organization itself that individ-
ual nations responded poorly to the 
spread of the virus, structural flaws 
within the organization and lack of 
credibility from its Director Gen-
eral likely worsened confidence in 
WHO guidance.
Goals
     In my analysis, I will examine 
three possible policy alternatives to 
the status quo of the WHO. To eval-
uate each of my policy alternatives, I 
will use two evaluative criteria. The 
first criterion will be cost-effective-
ness. Questions regarding this crite-
rion include whether the alternative 
will be more effective at preventing 
a public health disaster than the cur-
rent status of WHO, or if required 
member state contributions would 
increase. I will also analyze the po-
litical feasibility of each alternative 
by evaluating whether or not the 
governments of highly contributing 
member states will favor possible 
changes. After thorough consider-
ation of each alternative, I will rec-
ommend the most effective option 
according to my chosen evaluative 
criteria, and the logistics of imple-
menting the chosen alternative.  
Role for Government
     According to an economic anal-
ysis from July 2020, it is estimated 
that total worldwide consumption 
loss as a result of COVID-19 is $3.8 
trillion dollars, or approximately 
4.2% of global GDP.15 It is likely that 
these losses will rise, as the pan-
demic has no end in sight until the 
broad implementation of vaccines, 
which poses a greater challenge to 
developing countries than devel-
oped nations due to global vaccine 
supply inequalities. The economic 
consequences of COVID-19 justi-
fy government intervention, as the 
spread of the coronavirus creates a 
negative externality that the mar-
ket will not offset on its own. While 
many world leaders espouse that 
the re-opening of economy must 
be prioritized over “social distanc-
ing” measures, a former director of 
the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) warned in April 
of 2020 that cases could get “five 
times or close to 10 times worse” if 
the return to normalcy is too rapid 
and without proper precautions.16 If 
leaders continue to maximize pro-
ductive output without regard for 
the possible acceleration of coro-
navirus spread, the humanitarian 
consequences will also intensify. As 
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of April 2021, global coronavirus 
cases exceed 136 million, with over 
2.9 million deaths.17 To properly ad-
dress future pandemics and prevent 
devastating economic consequences 
and millions of deaths, members of 
the international community must 
intervene and create policy chang-
es to the current structure of the 
WHO.
Policy Alternatives
Option 1: Grant the WHO the 
power of “Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism”
     My first possible policy alternative 
would involve modifying the WHO, 
giving it the power to enforce agree-
ments and creating a required con-
tribution minimum to ensure it re-
ceives proper funding. Enforcement 
power would involve the creation of 
a “Dispute Settlement Mechanism” 
(DSM) power for WHO authorities 
and member states, which would 
allow for an intrusion of national 
sovereignty upon member states in 
the event that international public 
health guidelines were violated.18 
The World Trade Organization pos-
sesses DSM power and is able to is-
sue a fine to member nations when 
one violates an agreement. In this 
process, a member nation of the 
WTO can present another nation’s 
violation of trade guidelines to an 
impartial appellate court of WTO 
panelists and fellow WTO nations.19 
While this process in total can take 
up to one to three years, it is essen-
tial to properly address the diffusion 
of responsibility for damages that 
may occur once the long-term im-
pacts of COVID are fully realized. 
     An implementation of the DSM 
in the WHO would allow states to 
appeal violations of internation-
al health guidelines to an unbiased 
panel of WHO officials, especially 
when violations caused economic 
and humanitarian damages. For ex-
ample, states could argue inaction 
by China at the onset of COVID-19 
in Wuhan resulted in a worsened 
spread of the disease initially, and 
that it was a gross violation of WHO 
guidelines. Additionally, it would 
allow the WHO to act faster when 
emergencies occur and incentivize 
foreign governments to take proper 
precautions. For example, the WHO 
recommended lockdowns to pre-
vent the spread of COVID in late 
January of 2020, yet most Western 
governments did not issue stay-at-
home orders until late March, when 
the virus had already been spread-
ing internationally for months.20 In 
this scenario, a member state abid-
ing by WHO lockdown recommen-
dations could present a case arguing 
that inaction by these countries at 
the onset of this pandemic further 
intensified the spread of COVID 
internationally. Even though DSM 
trials are oftentimes slow-moving 
and inefficient, the opportunity for 
member states to hold one another 
accountable for any violations of in-
ternational guidelines is essential to 
a stronger WHO.
  While giving the WHO DSM 
power may aid the halting of future 
pandemics, better global health 
standards are necessary as a basis for 
these enforcement decisions. The 
International Health Regulations 
(IHR) act as a template for action 
in a global public health emergency 
and determine criteria for a public 
health emergency of international 
concern (PHEIC). These guidelines 
were most recently updated in 2005 
after the MERS outbreak and were 
successful in addressing outbreaks 
of H1N1, polio, Zika, and Ebola in 
the decade after the update.21 Un-
fortunately, the current IHR was not 
effective at addressing the current 
COVID-19 crisis. While the agree-
ment legally binds member nations 
to “develop core health capacities to 
detect and respond to public health 
emergencies,” compliance to this 
requirement is lacking, as many 
governments did not launch an ad-
equate governmental response to 
the initial spread of COVID.22 The 
WHO was also a week late to de-
clare COVID a PHEIC under the 
clauses of the current IHR, which 
caused policymakers to lose crucial 
time in coordinating an internation-
al response to the initial outbreak in 
Wuhan.23    
     To remedy the problem of WHO 
underfunding, I would suggest a 
required member fee that is pro-
portional to GDP. In the 2018-2019 
biennium, five of the top ten WHO 
donors were nonprofit organiza-
tions rather than sovereign nations, 
with the third highest donation 
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coming from the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation.24 While the U.S. 
and UK were the top donors during 
that two-year period, their contri-
butions were only a small fraction 
of their respective GDPs.25 Anoth-
er problem with the status quo of 
WHO funding is the reliance on 
voluntary contributions; according 
to an analysis of the 2018-2019 bud-
get, less than $1 billion of the $4.8 
billion budget came from mandato-
ry contributions.26 If the WHO rais-
es the requirement for mandatory 
contributions in addition to raising 
the organization’s overall budget, 
the WHO would be able to create 
more consistent and effective policy. 
Creating a more powerful WHO 
may seem politically infeasible due 
to the importance of national sov-
ereignty amongst the internation-
al community, yet the long-lasting 
impact of COVID-19 may shift the 
global landscape in favor of stronger, 
more impactful global governance. 
It is also difficult for governments 
to justify raising financial commit-
ments to international organizations 
to their citizens, as the primary ben-
efit of strong global governance is 
prevention of disaster, rather than 
a specified tangible policy outcome. 
If the WHO prevents pandemics in 
the future, uneducated onlookers 
may view it as an organization with 
little purpose or use. Regardless of 
these difficulties, attitudes towards 
the WHO may change once the full 
impact of COVID has been realized. 
These implications suggest that oth-
er policy solutions may be neces-
sary to increase the efficiency of the 
WHO.
Option 2: Create a new interna-
tional agreement
     Another possible alternative 
would be to maintain the current 
structure of the WHO while creat-
ing a separate international agree-
ment with fewer nations. One op-
tion would consist of an agreement 
similar to the Paris Climate Accords, 
where each nation would set an in-
dividual goal for public health infra-
structure improvements to maintain 
and uphold. To improve the en-
forcement power of an internation-
al agreement, one could adopt an 
agreement with stringent guidelines 
similar to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
has been more widely enforced than 
the Paris Agreement. Agreements 
with more rigid guidelines would 
likely be less politically feasible and 
have less widespread international 
support, yet alternatively, more flex-
ible agreements would likely be less 
effective in influencing global public 
health policy. After the introduction 
of several vaccines, it may be best 
for an international agreement to 
incentivize the distribution of vac-
cines ahead of the more complex 
task of creating global health secu-
rity infrastructure to prevent future 
pandemics.
 An advantage of the trea-
ty approach is that it would allow 
nations to utilize international or-
ganizations and other existing in-
stitutions for the disputing of po-
tential inter-state conflicts after the 
pandemic. The WTO already has 
the power of DSM, so disgruntled 
nations could present arguments for 
inaction to the pandemic in a con-
text of economic damages. Another 
justified DSM case may come from 
arguing against “cases of unjustified 
trade restrictions’’ that were ineffec-
tive during the initial stages of the 
pandemic.27 In addition, civil society 
watchdog groups may be the most 
realistic way of monitoring member 
state compliance28, as many nations 
have little appetite for organizations 
or treaties that infringe on their na-
tional sovereignty. These trends are 
evidenced by the lack of adherence 
to human rights doctrine across his-
tory, particularly under authoritari-
an or nationalist governments. 
Option 3: Abandon the WHO 
entirely
     The alternative that seems the 
most politically feasible in the con-
text of global authoritarian backslid-
ing is to abandon the WHO entirely 
due to its failure to address China’s 
initial mishandling of the novel 
coronavirus. Isolationists would 
favor this option, as many see the 
WHO as wasteful and ineffective at 
coercing foreign leaders to change 
their policies. In this scenario, states 
would set their own public health 
priorities, without international co-
operation. While abandoning global 
governance would save billions in 
funds for foreign governments, it 
would leave the world unprepared 
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for future pandemics. Due to cli-
mate change and agricultural tech-
niques that put people into contact 
with animal habitats, scientists ex-
pect that pandemics will reoccur in 
the coming years.29   
     In the absence of an international 
global public health authority, many 
nations may look towards the global 
world hegemon, the United States, 
to become the world’s leading pub-
lic health authority. There are a vari-
ety of problems with a U.S.-centered 
global health system. Firstly, the U.S. 
lacks the impartiality and credibility 
it takes to take the role of the WHO. 
Due to the U.S.’s grotesque colonial 
history and completely inadequate 
COVID-19 response by the Trump 
administration, many governments 
will never see the U.S. government 
as a reliable leader of an interna-
tional coalition. These trends are 
best evidenced by an incident where 
the CIA organized a fake vaccina-
tion drive in Pakistan to obtain the 
DNA of Osama bin Laden’s family.30 
Without trust from the internation-
al community, the U.S. could poten-
tially fumble groundbreaking health 
accomplishments the WHO is close 
to completing, such as the eradica-
tion of Polio.31
     In evaluating each of my pro-
posed policy alternatives in terms of 
cost-effectiveness, a reformed WHO 
with an updated IHR, DSM power, 
and better funding would rank the 
highest. If tangible consequences 
are introduced for non-compliance 
with revised WHO guidelines, this 
path would provide the greatest 
chance of preventing future crises 
for the lowest cost. According to 
a report by the JAMA Health Fo-
rum, “Sustainable investments in 
the WHO would more than pay for 
themselves,” as they would reduce 
government spending occurring in 
the event of pandemics, such as the 
trillions the U.S. government spent 
on COVID-19 stimulus packages.32 
Unfortunately, the option of a re-
formed WHO may be the least po-
litically feasible, as many member 
nations would likely oppose these 
changes or leave the WHO entirely 
if they were to be implemented. A 
comprehensive global health treaty 
would be next most cost-effective, as 
it would be more politically feasible 
than a broad alteration of the WHO 
and still allow for enhanced interna-
tional cooperation in the realm of 
public health security. It is unlikely 
that a treaty would be as effective as 
a reformed WHO, as a treaty does 
not replace the role of a centralized 
organization whose sole goal is to 




     The option of reforming the 
WHO is the most appealing under 
my evaluative criteria. To imple-
ment these recommended changes, 
it would be essential to hold a sum-
mit of member states and WHO of-
ficials to discuss the logistics of rais-
ing member fees, creating a DSM 
tribunal, and revising the IHR, soon 
into the post-vaccine era. While one 
could be tempted to favor the input 
of the nations with the highest vol-
untary contributions to the WHO 
(the U.S. and the UK), it is impera-
tive that nations such as China and 
Russia, whose leaders may be more 
resistant to an organization that 
could violate their national sover-
eignty, are also supportive of the 
possible reforms. The voices of lead-
ers of the global south must also be 
considered in negotiations, as much 
of the health capacity building proj-
ects that the WHO undertakes oc-
cur in the regions of sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin America, as well as 
South and East Asia. Some experts 
even recommend moving the WHO 
headquarters to sub-Saharan Afri-
ca, to allow the organization to “re-
spond rapidly where its technical 
assistance is needed most.”33
 Beyond discussion of the re-
forms themselves, a process must be 
created to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the reforms made to the WHO. 
During the proposed summit, the 
creation of an oversight committee 
monitoring the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of the WHO’s existing 
projects and new reforms is neces-
sary. This committee would be most 
useful in the event of the next PHE-
IC, where it could compare global 
economic damages and promptness 
of international response under the 
revised WHO, to the response and 
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Night lanterns in the old Taiwanese gold mining town of Jiufen. While mining no longer occurs, the town has turned 
into a popular tourist destination famous for its deserts and tea. 
Photo by Christian DeSimone, Class of 2021
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A view of the mountains at the Alps, Interlaken, Switzerland. 
Photo by Danny Sachs, Lafayette College Class of 2022
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This picture is of many tunnels that wind through the incredibly steep and tightly packed mountains in Taroko Na-
tional Park, located on the eastern coast of Taiwan. 
Photo by Christian DeSimone, Class of 2021
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ognition of human rights; moving 
from the policy of non-interference 
to non-indifference so the African 
Union had the right to intervene; 
and creating a regional peacekeep-
ing force. In this essay, I seek to an-
swer the question of whether or not 
the AU accomplished its mission of 
establishing the principle of non-in-
difference and holding its mem-
bers to a higher standard of human 
rights, through four case studies.
Scope, Relevance, and Defi-
nitions 
     Human rights in Africa have in-
creasingly come into international 
attention in recent decades, as po-
litical instability, economic troubles, 
and climate/war refugee crises have 
plagued many countries. In this es-
say, I will cover 1963 to the present, 
but focus specifically on case stud-
ies emerging in the post-Cold War 
and early 2000s years, as the OAU 
was replaced by the African Union. 
While there is generally an interna-
tionally inclusive definition of hu-
man rights (this essay defines hu-
man rights as the ones listed in the 
UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights), there is the less-un-
derstood challenge of defining hu-
man rights protections The United 
Nations leans on a combination of 
peacekeeping missions, internation-
al military intervention, treaty bod-
ies and councils, R2P (responsibility 
to protect,) and UN bodies such as 
the UN Security Council.1 The Af-
rican Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), estab-
lished in the 1981 African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and 
One of the most striking features of contemporary African history is how of-
ten actors have committed human 
rights abuses against people across 
national borders. This paper seeks to 
compare the effectiveness of the Or-
ganization of African Unity (OAU), 
and its successor, the African Union 
(AU), in protecting human rights on 
the continent. I hypothesize that the 
OAU, already weakened by internal 
Cold War divisions, was ill-adapt-
ed to the challenges and conflicts 
of the last half of the 20th century. 
Throughout its existence, the OAU 
failed to encourage better gover-
nance and stand up against human 
rights abuses. The AU was con-
sciously better structured to inter-
vene in human rights abuses, which 
it did in three key ways: explicit rec-
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also known as the Banjul Charter, 
defines human rights protections 
far more vaguely, focusing on the 
legality of human rights issues and 
research.2 The ACHPR has three hu-
man rights monitoring procedures: 
the state-reporting procedure, the 
inter-state complaints procedure, 
and the individual complaints pro-
cedure.3 
     Due to the overlapping and con-
fusing agreements on what pro-
tections look like,this essay only 
focuses on evaluating the effective-
ness of the OAU and AU’s usage of 
international intervention in cases 
where poor governance met human 
rights abuses. Additionally, I ask 
the reader to consider how most of 
the states on the continent are part 
of the OAU and African Union, so 
membership alone cannot account 
for the variation in human rights 
protection. This paper will primari-
ly pull from case studies throughout 
the given time period. 
Historical Timeline and 
Topic Background
     Since its conception in 1963, the 
OAU has been consistently involved 
in the human rights struggle, as 
demonstrated by “the struggle for 
the decolonisation of Africa and the 
right to self-determination and in-
dependence.” However, it was only 
after transitioning into the African 
Union that not only were human 
rights made into an explicit part of its 
charter, but protections were actual-
ly integrated into its regular practic-
es.4 With the exception of Morocco, 
which withdrew for 32 years before 
rejoining, the OAU/AU has consis-
tently maintained continent-wide 
membership. The OAU aimed to 
promote unity, accelerate liberation 
from colonial rule, and help states 
achieve economic success indepen-
dent of their former colonial rulers. 
Because of how fresh independence 
movements and colonialism were 
in the African consciousness when 
the OAU was created, the organiza-
tion emphasized state sovereignty 
and non-intervention in domestic 
affairs, and had little enforcement 
capacity to carry out its goals. In 
terms of human rights in particular, 
these characteristics hindered OAU 
intervention, as the majority of con-
flict on the African continent is not 
interstate conflict, but intrastate 
conflict (e.g. civil wars and conflicts 
involving non-state actors).5
     The African Union was an at-
tempt to better serve the needs of a 
decolonized Africa. Its restructur-
ing sought to solve many of the en-
forcement issues of the OAU and to 
grant the organization more power, 
following the precedent of the sim-
ilar European Union. The African 
Union’s strong emphasis on human 
rights, and the bodies it has created 
to protect them, has coincided with 
the use and growth of international 
involvement in peacekeeping. How-
ever, the African Union has much 
work to do, if it is to accomplish its 
ambitious goals of protecting hu-
man rights across the continent. 
The OAU
     Very quickly after its creation, the 
Banjul Charter seemed like an in-
adequate basis for action, especial-
ly with only the tools of weak and 
insecure state governments. There 
was also the economic weakness of 
many African states (i.e. they could 
not contribute funding resources 
to multilateral organizations), and 
thus the OAU through its operat-
ing years, which limited its enforce-
ment. But ultimately, the nail in the 
coffin was the principle of non-in-
tervention, contrasting directly with 
the African Union’s principle of 
non-indifference. The case studies I 
will look at here are the Biafran War 
and the Uganda-TanzaniaWar.
The OAU in the Nigerian Civil 
War/Biafran War (1967-70) 
     The Biafran War was a civil war 
that attempted to stop the secession 
of the Biafran region, which was 
populated mostly by Igbo people 
and contains the lucrative, oil-pro-
ducing region of the Niger Delta. 
The Biafran Conflict was the OAU’s 
first true management crisis. The 
conflict was complicated by how in-
vested more powerful non-African 
actors (such as the United States, 
Soviet Union, etc.) were, due to 
the issue of resource access and the 
fact that the Biafran War was a civil 
war.6 The first mistake of the OAU 
was to initially dismiss the deteri-
orating situation in Nigeria. Then, 
when the organization caved in to 
international pressure to start peace 
talks, it only brought in the federal 
government of Nigeria. Scholars at 
the time recognized the incompe-
tency of these efforts, and “it is with 
the same naivete and ineptness that 
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the OAU approached other African 
conflicts.”7
     Because the OAU was unable 
to enforce its decision to support 
Nigeria as an anti-secessionist or-
ganization, the Nigerian situation 
divided Africa between states that 
recognized Biafra and those that did 
not, which demonstrated its weak-
ness to the continent as well as to 
the outside world. Nigeria thus be-
came an “open field for unilateral 
third-party intervention by extra 
Africa[n] states.”8 This blanket sup-
port became tacit permission for the 
enormous human rights violations 
committed in Biafra, with estimates 
ranging from 500,000 to 6 mil-
lion wartime casualties, as well as a 
million total deaths due to starva-
tion and disease.9 Indeed, the OAU 
passed a resolution formally con-
demning secession, and refused Ni-
geria-Biafra diplomatic mediation 
by not allowing Biafra an audience 
with the OAU. In direct contrast, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat (United 
Kingdom) began peace talks with 
both sides to begin finding a diplo-
matic solution.10 While these were 
also ultimately unsuccessful, the 
Commonwealth made more prog-
ress in conflict management than 
the OAU, yet again undermining its 
efficacy. Albeit at this time the OAU 
was extremely new, but it was clear 
that the OAU did not necessarily 
have a vested interest in protect-
ing human rights — it first failed to 
criticize the Nigerian blockade that 
was causing the food shortages, and 
then dragged its feet in completing 
negotiations.11 The consultative sta-
tus of the OAU reflects the view that 
this was a domestic dispute, rather 
than one that concerned most Afri-
can nations. 
The OAU in the Uganda-Tanza-
nia War (1978-79) 
     Relations between Tanzania and 
Uganda were tense, due to Ugandan 
President Idi Amin’s coup of Mil-
ton Obote and Tanzanian President 
Julius Nyerere’s support of Obote. 
Both Tanzania and Uganda were in 
violation of OAU’s non-interference 
principle — Tanzania for invading 
and overthrowing Amin, Uganda 
for annexing Tanzanian territory 
— but Amin was notorious for his 
human rights abuses. His adminis-
tration actively committed political 
repression and extrajudicial killings, 
and the death toll during his years 
in power is estimated to be between 
80,000 and 500,000.12 Interestingly, 
the Uganda-Tanzania War lacks the 
Cold War dimension that compli-
cated many African conflicts. 
     First, we must address why the 
OAU did not intervene or even dis-
cuss Amin’s brutality, even when 
the Uganda-Tanzania War began. 
Indeed, the OAU summit was host-
ed in Kampala in 1975, the same 
year Amin became chairman of the 
OAU. Only after the 1975 summit 
did concerns around Amin’s chair-
manship begin to develop, and yet 
there was no active conceptualiza-
tion of the human rights violations 
occurring.13 In the conflict, despite 
the extraterritorial actions of both 
nations and the blatant disregard 
of OAU policies, Nyerere’s invasion 
of Uganda was quietly accepted by 
most external observers. Crucially, 
the OAU declined to formally con-
demn the Ugandan invasion, and 
Nyerere privately invoked humani-
tarian concerns, but never publicly 
linked them to Uganda’s interven-
tion, as to do so would have been 
an admission to breaking the OAU 
Charter.14 This clarifies that the 
OAU was not only turning a blind 
eye to Amin’s atrocities but de facto 
discouraging military intervention 
based on human rights. 
     The task of mediating the con-
flict fell to the OAU, but with both 
parties unwilling to negotiate diplo-
matic mediation, mediation seemed 
to stall. However, suddenly on No-
vember 14, 1978, Amin “announced 
an unconditional withdrawal and 
invited OAU observers to witness 
it.”15 Although this was claimed as 
a successful OAU effort, Amin’s 
decision in reality had more to do 
with the realization that he had little 
support — the conflict was frozen 
rather than resolved. This failure 
to broker a lasting peace spoke not 
only to the OAU’s widely acknowl-
edged impotence in resolving dis-
putes, but also to how its policy in-
stitutions were ineffectual at taking 
action and could mostly only advise 
and mediate. In the OAU’s state of 
forced neutrality and lack of exec-
utive power, African nations could 
easily disregard the decisions and 
vague resolutions of the organiza-
tion. By engaging in more decisive, 
and perhaps military, intervention 
during Amin’s reign, the human ef-
fects of the Uganda-Tanzania War 
and Amin’s war crimes could have 
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been reduced, if not eliminated en-
tirely. 
The African Union
     The African Union has taken far 
more of an interventionist approach 
to stopping human rights violations, 
by developing legal frameworks and 
developing the principle of non-in-
difference, reflecting a new political 
culture that prioritizes democracy 
and intervention. I will again look at 
two case studies here, including one 
regional peacekeeping mission: the 
UN-AU Mission in Darfur and the 
Libyan Civil War. 
African Union Mission in Su-
dan (AMIS) and United Na-
tions-African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID): 2004-07, 
2007-present 
     AMIS was unable to contain the 
human rights crisis in Darfur, Su-
dan for several reasons.
     UNAMID is a joint peacekeep-
ing mission that absorbed the Af-
rican Union Mission in Sudan and 
aimed to stabilize Darfur, Sudan, 
while peace talks continued. Joint 
missions are important in allow-
ing the AU to stay at the forefront 
of continental conversations on hu-
man rights, while providing more 
manpower and experience to in-
crease the capacity of intervention. 
They are also a financial necessity; 
many African states fail to pay their 
OAU dues, and the AU’s “chronic 
failure to raise enough financial and 
human resources to conduct peace-
keeping or peace support operations 
has been embarrassing to the orga-
nization.”16 The $26 million USD 
budget for the original 2004 African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
was funded entirely by international 
donors, including the UN, Europe-
an Union, and NATO, with no AU 
member states contributing to the 
funding.17 Financial instability not 
only made the presence of AMIS 
in Sudan unviable in the long-run, 
but also reduced its ability to de-
fend those in Darfur. This reduced 
ability led the AU to finally accede 
to joint UN intervention with the 
establishment of UNAMID, con-
ceding control notably to the United 
States, who played a key role in the 
recruitment of peacekeeping troops. 
By handing over control, UNAMID 
was allowed to become one of the 
largest and most expensive peace-
keeping operations ever deployed, 
with nearly 20,000 troops and staff, 
to meet the needs of Darfur.18
The Libyan Crisis (2011) 
     When the Libyan Crisis broke out 
with the Arab Spring and the oust-
ing of Gaddafi, there was hope that 
the African Union would decisive-
ly step in and create “African solu-
tions to African problems.”19 But 
not only were the African Union’s 
first half-hearted measures (includ-
ing trying to dispatch a fact-find-
ing mission) quickly overridden; 
they were eventually shut out of the 
peace-making process entirely. The 
AU also had internal disagreements 
over how to respond to Libya, fur-
ther slowing its response. The AU’s 
marginalization in responding to 
the Libyan Crisis comes partly from 
this failure to send a fact-finding 
mission, as the UN would have had 
to step back — the UN Charter rec-
ognizes the importance of regional 
arrangements, and “regional ar-
rangements are enjoined to make 
every effort to achieve pacific settle-
ment of local disputes through such 
regional arrangements … before re-
ferring them to the Security Coun-
cil.”20 Subsequent UNSC resolution 
1973, authorizing the use of force 
(de facto providing the justification 
for NATO intervention), and then 
the UNSC’s refusal of the AU’s Ad 
Hoc Committee, supposedly the de-
cision-making committee of the AU 
on Libya, to meet Gaddafi, the AU 
was shut out entirely.21
      The Libyan Crisis is yet anoth-
er example of compelling enforce-
ment power, the lack of true AU 
financial commitment to regional 
peacekeeping, and aforementioned 
internal divisions. Although Gadd-
afi ignored AU demands to end the 
crisis peacefully, the AU hesitated 
to intervene or impose sanctions, 
because Libya was a key leader in 
the formation of the AU and one 
of “five countries contributing 75% 
of the AU budget.”22 An important 
disagreement was on the acceptance 
of UN and NATO intervention: 
some member states accepted UN 
intervention while disapproving of 
NATO, some opposed NATO’s op-
eration in Libya, and some support-
ed NATO. There was also disagree-
ment on how to handle Gaddafi, 
and whether or not to recognize the 
UN-implemented Libyan transi-
tional government. The AU’s road-
map for Libya was unable to reach 




However, unlike under the OAU, 
tangible steps were taken towards 
the goal of reducing human rights 
abuses and fostering peace, such as 
the creation of the AU Peace and 
Security Council, which replaced 
the OAU Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Res-
olution. However, even beyond dip-
lomatic rhetoric, the Libyan crisis 
was an embarrassment for an or-
ganization that claimed to promote 
Pan-African consensus but could 
not hold its own members account-
able to committee-wide decisions. 
     Even though the African Union 
has engaged in relatively more suc-
cessful international intervention, 
its “ambivalent, and at best muted, 
response” to humanitarian crises in 
Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Mali has 
drawn criticism.23 Part of this can be 
attributed to the difficulty of reach-
ing consensus on regional peace-
keeping missions, as many African 
states have not ratified the protocol 
establishing the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, indi-
cating that governments are selec-
tive in choosing when and when not 
to intervene. Another burden is low 
organizational capacity: because the 
African Union does not have the 
manpower to engage in every in-
stance of human rights violations, 
the organization has become rela-
tively dependent on UN interven-
tion. 
Final Comparison and Con-
clusion
     After comparing the two orga-
nizations, it is clear that the OAU 
was set up to be ineffective by de-
sign, as the OAU was at its core a 
conservative, anti-secessionist, an-
ti-interventionist institution that 
affirmed state decisions selective-
ly and was able to hide behind the 
idea of state sovereignty to avoid 
actively defending human rights on 
the continent. The African Union 
has seen great success in improving 
transparency and initiative in pro-
tecting human rights, compared to 
the Organization of African Unity, 
and its public rhetoric has reflected 
this new emphasis on intervention. 
However, without achieving finan-
cial independence and raising its or-
ganizational capacities, the AU will 
be unable to shed its colonial-era 
structural limitations and transform 
into a truly modern multilateral or-
ganization that is respected and ca-
pable of swift action in Africa. Be-
cause the autonomy of the African 
state has been increasingly eroded 
by the international community, 
the limited independence translates 
to the supranational level as well, 
where the AU is constrained in its 
decision-making power and de-
pends on the United Nations. (The 
Libyan Crisis demonstrates this fi-
nancial dilemma: the lack of political 
will to impose punitive measures on 
rulers who contribute funding leads 
to a less democratic organization). 
Due to this, my earlier hypothesis 
of whether the AU does a better job 
than the OAU of protecting human 
rights abuses is only half correct — 
it’s true that the OAU certainly did 
not pay as close attention nor was 
as invested in resolving conflicts as 
the AU, but much can be attribut-
ed to the fundamental difference 
of non-intervention. The African 
Union’s revised structure bodes well 
for future action on preventing hu-
man rights abuses, but at this point 
in time, the AU does not have the 
capacity to succeed in interventions 
without assistance from the UN or 
other organizations.
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Crowded beaches in Rio de Janeiro, just a few months before COVID-19 arrived in Brazil. The gorgeous sunset re-
flects along the water with the Morro Dois Irmãos visible in the distance.
Photo by Gustavo Nativio, Class of 2023
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The Church of our Lady before Tyn is the most alluring and visually appealing part of the old town square, attract-
ing thousands of visitors each day. Photo taken at Old Town Square, Prague. 
Photo by Jordan Wade, Baylor University Class of 2022
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A view of Cape Town from the top of nearby Table Mountain, South Africa. Dark clouds encircle the mountaintop, 
but the city is still awash in sunlight. 
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we opened the door so they would know 
we were not drinking their child’s blood, 
made our broth clear, why shouldn’t we be  
allowed to turn around the scrutiny? 
Burn down the house of the debtor and the debt  
is forgiven--learned that from the English? 
How do I claim a house that’s burning? 
It was supposed to be a homeland  
but it is laced with repetition, with more corpses 
in rivers with more war and war and war. 
Have you ever stood on the shore 
of a river, and felt only loss, 
like all that will ever swell on your tongue is grief? 
Was it the Danube? Was it the Jordan? 
we have seen death so often  
aren’t surprised when  
We look at our reflection in the water  
and it is there too. 
This is a country, not a graveyard,  
Remember
In Budapest, bronze shoes 
sit on the river, where Hungarian 
soldiers marched us from the ghetto 
and bound our arms with our own shoelaces, 
had children stand in front of parents 
to save bullets, let the velocity  
push them into the Danube— 
we find a store with my last name  
blazoned across it and I can’t shake off 
the feeling that if I touch the water I might 
be greeting kin— 
it is stuck in my throat 
bitter and hard like shards of bone and  
you wants to dredge the river, 
give the bodies a proper burial— 
did you know my father’s DNA 
test tells him nothing other than 
how thoroughly no country wants to own him. 
As though a country can claim a people  
they have slaughtered by the millions— 
as though cycles of abuse only perpetuate  
on a personal level. We are convinced 
growth only comes at the expense of others, 
like we learned from the Spanish, 
the German, like we are starting 
to teach in the Holy Land.
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